THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY COUP OF 2012
by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
The letter that follows takes us on a darkly imagined excursion into the future. A military coup has taken place in the United States -- the year is 2012 -- and General Thomas E. T. Brutus, Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of the United States, now occupies the White House as permanent Military Plenipotentiary. His position has been ratified by a national referendum, though scattered disorders still prevail and arrests for acts of sedition are underway. A senior retired officer of the Unified Armed Forces, known here simply as Prisoner 222305759, is one of those arrested, having been convicted by court-martial for opposing the coup. Prior to his execution, he is able to smuggle out of prison a letter to an old War College classmate discussing the "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." In it, he argues that the coup was the outgrowth of trends visible as far back as 1992. These trends were the massive diversion of military forces to civilian uses, the monolithic unification of the armed forces, and the insularity of the military community. His letter survives and is here presented verbatim.
It goes without saying (I hope) that the coup scenario above is purely a literary device intended to dramatize my concern over certain contemporary developments affecting the armed forces, and is emphatically not a prediction. -- The Author
Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide. -- John Adams
The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time. -- Carl von Clausewitz
Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason. -- John Harrington
The following is a work of fiction. Hopefully, it will remain one.
Unified Armed Forces
of the United States
Prisoner Dossier No.
ACCESS LIMITED TO
PERSONS APPROVED BY
Unified Armed Forces
of the United States
30 June 2012
Subject: Prisoner 222305759
To: General E. Thomas
1. As you know, in the last few months since the President's death and the abrupt retirement of the Vice President, there have been some instances of public unrest. I fully appreciate that the threat of disorder occasioned by the absence of a Chief Executive precipitated your assumption of power as Commander-in Chief, UAFUS, and your designation of yourself as permanent Military Plenipotentiary of the United States. It is obvious to me that strong leadership is needed in these troubled times. Indeed, I am convinced that it was inept civilian leadership that caused our defeat in the Second Gulf War.
2. Despite the approval of your actions by The Referendum, it was still necessary to make several arrests for acts of sedition. One of these traitors, I am sorry to say, is a retired officer and a 1992 graduate of the National War College. The officer, Prisoner 222305759, has been convicted by court-martial and is awaiting execution. In violation of my standing orders, the prisoner was allowed writing materials. Somehow he managed to draft a letter to a fellow alumnus chronicling what he calls the "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." By hand-writing the letter he defeated the electroscriber scanners we placed in his cell. Fortunately, our security forces were still able to intercept it.
3. Because of its potential interest to you, a copy of the prisoner's letter is attached. As the document indicates, the prisoner evidently had secreted into the stockade old notes, articles, and newspaper clippings he saved from his War College days. These documents were recovered in a search of the prisoner's cell. For your edification, I have had an intelligence agent analyze them and annotate your copy of the letter with endnotes citing these references where appropriate.
4. Upon receipt of your order affirming the sentence of the court, Prisoner 222305759 will be executed in accordance with applicable directives.
Unified Armed Forces
of the United States
25 June 2012
Subject: Analysis - Letter of Prisoner 222305759
1. Per your request of 18 June 2012 this organization evaluated the letter authored by Prisoner 222305759. The human-assisted computer analysis cross-referenced assertions in the Prisoner's letter with compuscanned notes and other papers seized from his cell. Numeric annotations have been inserted into the letter as requested. All of the referenced documents were dated 1992 or earlier. Additionally, the document has been paginated for your convenience.
2. It is our opinion that the views expressed in the letter are detrimental to military security. Accordingly, we recommend the immediate deletion of the referenced materials from the National Information Data Base under the Prevention of Mobocracy Decree of 2012. Furthermore, we recommend the prompt enforcement of the Prisoner's adjudged sentence. A proposed action effecting that sentence is attached.
17 June 2012
Dear Old Friend,
It's hard to believe that 20 years have passed since we graduated from the War College! Remember the great discussions, the trips, the parties, the people? Those were the days!!!
I'm not having quite as much fun anymore. You've heard about the Sedition Trials? Yeah, I was one of those arrested -- convicted of "disloyal statements," and "using contemptuous language towards officials."  Disloyal? No. Contemptuous? You bet! With General Brutus in charge it's not hard to be contemptuous.
I've got to hand it to Brutus, he's ingenious. After the President died he somehow "persuaded" the Vice President not to take the oath of office. Did we then have a President or not? A real "Constitutional Conundrum" the papers called it.  Brutus created just enough ambiguity to convince everyone that as the senior military officer, he could -- and should -- declare himself Commander-in-Chief of the Unified Armed Forces. Remember what he said? "Had to fill the power vacuum." And Brutus showed he really knew how to use power: he declared martial law, "postponed" the elections, got the Vice President to "retire," and even moved into the White House! "More efficient to work from there," he said. Remember that?
When Congress convened that last time and managed to pass the Referendum Act, I really got my hopes up. But when the Referendum approved Brutus's takeover, I knew we were in serious trouble. I caused a ruckus, you know, trying to organize a protest. Then the Security Forces picked me up. My quickie "trial" was a joke. The sentence? Well, let's just say you won't have to save any beer for me at next year's reunion. Since it doesn't look like I'll be seeing you again, I thought I'd write everything down and try to get it to you. I convinced one of the young guards to let me keep my pen and paper. (I don't think he knew what the stuff was -- the kid's probably used a Voistronic electroscriber his whole life!)
I want to write the "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." I think it's important to get the truth recorded before they rewrite history. If we're ever going to get our freedom back, we've got to understand how we got into this mess. People need to understand that the armed forces exist to support and defend government, not to be the government. Faced with intractable national problems on one hand, and an energetic and capable military on the other, it can be all too seductive to start viewing the military as a cost-effective solution. We made a terrible mistake when we allowed the armed forces to be diverted from their original purpose.
I found a box of my notes and clippings from our War College days -- told my keepers I needed them to write the confession they want. It's amazing; looking through these old papers makes me realize that even back in 1992 we should have seen this coming. The seeds of this outrage were all there; we just didn't realize how they would grow. But isn't that always the way with things like this? Somebody once said that "the true watersheds in human affairs are seldom spotted amid the tumult of headlines broadcast on the hour."  And we had a lot of headlines back in the '90s to distract us:  The economy was in the dumps, crime was rising, schools were deteriorating, drug use was rampant, the environment was in trouble, and political scandals were occurring almost daily. Still, there was some good news: the end of the Cold War as well as America's recent victory over Iraq.
All of this and more contributed to the situation in which we find ourselves today: a military that controls government and one that, ironically, can't fight. It wasn't any single cause that led us to this point. Instead, it was a combination of several different developments, the beginnings of which were evident in 1992. Here's what I think happened:
Americans became exasperated with democracy. We were disillusioned with the apparent inability of elected government to solve the nation's dilemmas. We were looking for someone or something that could produce workable answers. The one institution of government in which the people retained faith was the military. Buoyed by the military's obvious competence in the First Gulf War, the public increasingly turned to it for solutions to the country's problems. Americans called for an acceleration of trends begun in the 1980s: tasking the military with a variety of new, nontraditional missions, and vastly escalating its commitment to formerly ancillary duties.
Though not obvious at the time, the cumulative effect of these new responsibilities was to incorporate the military into the political process to an unprecedented degree. These additional assignments also had the perverse effect of diverting focus and resources from the military's central mission of combat training and warfighting. Finally, organizational, political, and societal changes served to alter the American military's culture. Today's military is not the one we knew when we graduated.
Let me explain how I came to these conclusions. In 1992 not very many people would've thought a military coup d'etat  could ever happen here. Sure, there were eccentric conspiracy theorists who saw the Pentagon's hand in the assassination of President Kennedy,  President Nixon's downfall,  and similar events. But even the most avid believers had to admit that no outright military takeover had ever occurred before now. Ever since Washington's admonitions about the dangers of overgrown military establishments in his Farewell address,  Americans generally viewed their armed forces with a judicious mixture of respect and wariness.  For over two centuries that vigilance was rewarded,  and most Americans came to consider the very notion of a military coup preposterous. Historian Andrew Janos captured the conventional view of the latter half of the 20th century in this clipping I saved:
[A] coup d'etat in the United States would be too fantastic to contemplate, not only because few would actually entertain the idea, but also because the bulk of the people are strongly attached to the prevailing political system and would rise in defense of a political leader even though they might not like him. The environment most hospitable to coups d'etat is one in which political apathy prevails as the dominant style. 
However, when Janos wrote that back in 1964, 61.9 percent of the electorate voted.  Since then voter participation has steadily declined.  By 1988 only 50.1 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot.  Simple extrapolation of those numbers to last spring's Referendum would have predicted almost exactly the turnout. It was precisely reversed from that of 1964: 61.9 percent of the electorate did not vote.
America's societal malaise was readily apparent in 1992. Seventy-eight percent of Americans believed the country was on the "wrong track."  One researcher declared that social indicators were at their lowest level in 20 years and insisted "something [was] coming loose in the social infrastructure."  The nation was frustrated and angry about its problems. 
America wanted solutions and democratically elected government wasn't providing them.  The country suffered from a "deep pessimism about politicians and government after years of broken promises."  David Finkle observed in The Washington Post Magazine that for most Americans "the perception of government is that it has evolved from something that provides democracy's framework into something that provides obstacles, from something to celebrate into something to ignore."  Likewise, politicians and their proposals seemed stale and repetitive.  Millions of voters gave up hope of finding answers.  The "environment of apathy" Janos characterized as a precursor to a coup had arrived. 
Unlike the rest of government the military enjoyed a remarkably steady climb in popularity throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.  And indeed it had earned the admiration of the public. Debilitated by the Vietnam War, the US military set about reinventing itself.  As early as 1988 U.S. News & World Report heralded the result: "In contrast to the dispirited, drug-ravaged, do-your-own-thing armed services of the '70s and early '80s, the US military has been transformed into a fighting force of gung-ho attitude, spit-shined discipline, and ten-hut morale." After the US military dealt Iraq a crushing defeat in the First Gulf War, the ignominy of Vietnam evaporated. 
When we graduated from the War College in 1992, the armed forces were the smartest,  best educated,  and best disciplined  force in history. While polls showed that the public invariably gave Congress low marks,  a February 1991 survey disclosed that "public confidence in the military soar[ed] to 85 percent, far surpassing every other institution in our society."  The armed forces had become America's most  -- and perhaps only -- trusted arm of government.
Assumptions about the role of the military in society also began to change.
Twenty years before we graduated, the Supreme Court confidently declared in Laird v. Tatum that Americans had a "traditional and strong resistance to any military intrusion into civilian affairs."  But Americans were now rethinking the desirability and necessity of that resistance. They compared the military's principled competence with the chicanery and ineptitude of many elected officials, and found the latter wanting. 
Commentator James Fallows expressed the new thinking in an August 1991 article in Atlantic magazine. Musing on the contributions of the military to American society, Fallows wrote: "I am beginning to think that the only way the national government can do anything worthwhile is to invent a security threat and turn the job over to the military." He elaborated on his reasoning:
According to our economic and political theories, most agencies of the government have no special standing to speak about the general national welfare. Each represents a certain constituency; the interest groups fight it out. The military, strangely, is the one government institution that has been assigned legitimacy to act on its notion of the collective good. "National defense" can make us do things -- train engineers, build highways -- that long-term good of the nation or common sense cannot. 
Just about a decade before Fallows' article appeared, Congress initiated the use of "national defense" as a rationale to boost military participation in an activity historically the exclusive domain of civilian government: law enforcement. Congress concluded that the "rising tide of drugs being smuggled into the United States . . . present[ed] a grave threat to all Americans."  Finding the performance of civilian law enforcement agencies in counteracting that threat unsatisfactory, Congress passed the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act of 1981.  In doing so Congress specifically intended to force reluctant military commanders  to actively collaborate in police work. 
This was a historic change of policy. Since the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act  in 1878, the military had distanced itself from law enforcement activities.  While the 1981 law did retain certain limits on the legal authority of military personnel, its net effect  was to dramatically expand military participation in anti-drug efforts. By 1991 the Department of Defense was spending $1.2 billion on counternarcotics crusades.  Air Force surveillance aircraft were sent to track airborne smugglers; Navy ships patrolled the Caribbean looking for drug-laden vessels; and National Guardsmen were searching for marijuana caches near the borders.  By 1992 "combatting" drug trafficking was formally declared a "high national security mission." 
It wasn't too long before 21st-century legislators were calling for more military involvement in police work.  Crime seemed out of control. Most disturbing, the incidence of violent crime continued to climb.  Americans were horrified and desperate: a third even believed vigilantism could be justified.  Rising lawlessness was seen as but another example of the civilian political leadership's inability to fulfill government's most basic duty to ensure public safety.  People once again wanted the military to help.
Hints of an expanded police function were starting to surface while we were still at the War College. For example, District of Columbia National Guardsmen established a regular  military presence in high-crime neighborhoods not far from the War College.  Eventually, people became acclimated to seeing uniformed military personnel patrolling their neighborhood.  Now troops are an adjunct to almost all police forces in the country. In many of the areas where much of our burgeoning population of elderly Americans live -- Brutus calls them "National Security Zones"-- the military is often the only law enforcement agency. Consequently, the military was ideally positioned in thousands of communities to support the coup.
Concern about crime was a major reason why General Brutus's actions were approved in the Referendum. Although voter participation by the general public was low, older Americans voted at a much higher rate.  Furthermore, with the aging of the baby boom generation,  the block of American voters over 45 grew to almost 53 percent of the voters by 2010.  This wealthy,  older electorate welcomed an organization which could ensure their physical security.  And when it counted, they backed Brutus in the Referendum -- probably the last votes they'll ever cast.
The military's constituency was larger than just the aged. Poor Americans of all ages became dependent upon the military not only for protection against crime, but also for medical care. Again we saw the roots of this back in 1992. First it was the barely defeated proposal to use veterans' hospitals to provide care for the non-veteran poor.  Next were calls to deploy military medical assets to relieve hard-pressed urban hospitals.  As the number of uninsured and underinsured grew,  the pressure to provide care became inexorable. Now military hospitals serve millions of new, non-military patients. Similarly, a proposal to use so-called "underutilized"  military bases as drug rehabilitation centers was implemented on a massive scale.
Even the youngest citizens were co-opted. During the 1990s the public became aware that military officers had the math and science backgrounds  desperately needed to revitalize US education.  In fact, programs involving military personnel were already underway while we were at the War College.  We now have an entire generation of young people who have grown up comfortable with the sight of military personnel patrolling their streets and teaching in their classrooms.
As you know, it wasn't just crises in public safety, medical care, and education that the military was tasked to mend. The military was also called upon to manage the cleanup of the nation's environmental hazards. By 1992 the armed services were deeply involved in this arena,  As predicted,  that involvement mushroomed. Once the military demonstrated its expertise, it wasn't long before environmental problems were declared "national security threats"  and full responsibility devolved to the armed forces.
Other problems were transformed into "national security" issues. As more commercial airlines went bankrupt  and unprofitable air routes dropped, the military was called upon to provide "essential" air transport to the affected regions. In the name of national defense, the military next found itself in the sealift business.  Ships purchased by the military for contingencies  were leased, complete with military crews,  at low rates to US exporters to help solve the trade deficit. The nation's crumbling infrastructure was also declared a "national security threat." As was proposed back in 1991,  troops rehabilitated public housing, rebuilt bridges and roads, and constructed new government buildings. By late 1992, voices in both Congress and the military had reached a crescendo calling for military involvement across a broad spectrum of heretofore purely civilian activities. Soon, it became common in practically every community to see crews of soldiers working on local projects. Military attire drew no stares.
The revised charter for the armed forces was not confined to domestic enterprises. Overseas humanitarian and nation-building assignments proliferated.  Though these projects have always been performed by the military on an ad hoc basis,  in 1986 Congress formalized that process. It declared overseas humanitarian and civic assistance activities to be "valid military missions"  and specifically authorized them by law.  Fueled by favorable press for operations in Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Philippines during the early 1990s,  humanitarian missions were touted as the military's "model for the future."  That prediction came true. When several African governments collapsed under AIDS epidemics  and famines  around the turn of the century, US troops -- first introduced to the continent in the 1990s  -- were called upon to restore basic services. They never left.  Now the US military constitutes the de facto government in many of those areas. Once again, the first whisperings of such duties could be heard in 1992. 
By the year 2000 the armed forces had penetrated many vital aspects of American society. More and more military officers sought the kind of autonomy in these civilian affairs that they would expect from their military superiors in the execution of traditional combat operations. Thus began the inevitable politicization of the military. With so much responsibility for virtually everything government was expected to do, the military increasingly demanded a larger role in policymaking. But in a democracy policymaking is a task best left to those accountable to the electorate. Nonetheless, well-intentioned military officers, accustomed to the ordered, hierarchical structure of military society, became impatient with the delays and inefficiencies inherent in the democratic process. Consequently, they increasingly sought to avoid it. They convinced themselves that they could more productively serve the nation in carrying out their new assignments if they accrued to themselves unfettered power to implement their programs. They forgot Lord Acton's warning that "all power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." 
Congress became their unwitting ally. Because of the popularity of the new military programs -- and the growing dependence upon them -- Congress passed the Military Plenipotentiary Act of 2005. This legislation was the legacy of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  Among many revisions, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and mandated numerous changes intended to increase "jointness" in the armed services.  Supporters of the Military Plenipotentiary Act argued that unity of command was critical to the successful management of the numerous activities now considered "military" operations. Moreover, many Congressmen mistakenly  believed that Goldwater-Nichols was one of the main reasons for the military's success in the First Gulf War.  They viewed the Military Plenipotentiary Act as an enhancement of the strengths of Goldwater-Nichols.
In passing this legislation Congress added greater authority to the military's top leadership position. Lulled by favorable experiences with Chairmen like General Colin Powell,  Congress saw little danger in converting the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the even more powerful Military Plenipotentiary. No longer merely an advisor, the Military Plenipotentiary became a true commander of all US services, purportedly because that status could better ameliorate the effects of perceived interservice squabbling. Despite warnings found in the legislative history of Goldwater-Nichols  and elsewhere,  enormous power was concentrated in the hands of a single, unelected official. Unfortunately, Congress presumed that principled people would always occupy the office.  No one expected a General Brutus would arise.
The Military Plenipotentiary was not Congress's only structural change in military governance. By 2007 the services were combined to form the Unified Armed Forces. Recall that when we graduated from the War College greater unification was being seriously suggested as an economy measure.  Eventually that consideration, and the conviction that "jointness" was an unqualified military virtue,  led to unification. But unification ended the creative tension between the services.  Besides rejecting the operational logic of separate services,  no one seemed to recognize the checks-and-balances function that service separatism provided a democracy obliged to maintain a large, professional military establishment. The Founding Fathers knew the importance of checks and balances in controlling the agencies of government: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. . . . Experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary controls . . . [including] supplying opposite and rival interests." 
Ambition is a natural trait of military organizations and their leaders.  Whatever might have been the inefficiencies of separate military services, their very existence served to counteract the untoward desires of any single service. The roles and missions debates and other arguments, once seen as petty military infighting, also provided an invaluable forum for competitive analysis of military doctrine.  Additionally, they served to ensure that unscrupulous designs by a segment of the military establishment were ruthlessly exposed. Once the services were unified, the impetus to do so vanished, and the authority of the military in relation to the other institutions of government rose.  Distended by its pervasive new duties, monolithic militarism came to dominate the Darwinian political environment of 21st-century America.
Why did the uniformed leadership of our day acquiesce to this transformation of the military? Much of the answer can be traced to the budget showdowns of the early 1990s.  The collapse of the Soviet Union left the US military without an easily articulated rationale for large defense budgets.  Billions in cuts were sought.  Journalist Bruce Auster put it bluntly: "Winning a share of the budget wars . . . require[s] that the military find new missions for a post-Cold War world that is devoid of clear military threats."  Capitulating, military leaders embraced formerly disdained assignments. As one commentator cynically observed, "the services are eager to talk up nontraditional, budget-justifying roles."  The Vietnam-era aphorism, "It's a lousy war, but it's the only one we've got," was resuscitated.
Still, that doesn't completely explain why in 2012 the military leadership would succumb to a coup. To answer that question fully requires examination of what was happening to the officer corps as the military drew down in the 1980s and 1990s. Ever since large peacetime military establishments became permanent features after World War II, the great leveler of the officer corps was the constant influx of officers from the Reserve Officers Training Corps program. The product of diverse colleges and universities throughout the United States, these officers were a vital source of liberalism in the military services. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, that was changing. Force reductions decreased the number of ROTC graduates the services accepted.  Although General Powell called ROTC "vital to democracy," 62 ROTC programs were closed in 1991 and another 350 were considered for closure.  The numbers of officers produced by the service academies also fell, but at a significantly slower pace.  Consequently, the proportion of academy graduates in the officer corps climbed. 
It is an overstatement to say, as did one columnist back in '90, that the heavy scientific and technical emphasis of the academy curricula  produced "engineering mentalities that tend toward authoritarianism."  But it is true that the rigorous service academy experience  created powerful bonds between graduates within the officer corps. These unofficial linkages intensified when a proposal  to unify the academies was adopted in 1995. Graduates of the Unified Armed Services Academy, no longer tempered by the social heterogeneity brought by separate service academies and large numbers of ROTC officers, formed vital elements of the cabal that put Brutus in power.
Moreover, the ROTC officers that did remain increasingly came from a narrower range of schools. Focusing on the military's policy to exclude homosexuals from service, advocates of "political correctness" succeeded in driving ROTC from the campuses of some of our best universities.  In many instances they also prevailed in barring military recruiters from campus.  Little thought was given the long-term consequences of limiting the pool from which our military leadership is drawn.  The end result was much more homogeneous military elite whose outlook was progressively dissimilar to that of the nation's more broadly-based civilian leadership 
The enlisted ranks changed as well. Just as was feared in 1992,  the drawdown diminished the pluralism which had characterized the All-Volunteer Force since its inception  Paradoxically, while the opportunities for minorities and the disadvantaged lessened, a Pentagon study reported that "the children of the professional and managerial groups appear to be staying away from the military in significant numbers."  True, many recruits continued to be drawn from the middle class, but the size of that group itself shrunk.  Additionally, fewer women chose to serve.  At the same time longer enlistments and higher re-enlistment rates facilitated bonding  among troops drawn from a steadily more atypical sector of American society.
Furthermore, well-meaning attempts at improving service life  led to the unintended insularity of military society, representing a return to the cloistered life of the pre-World War II armed forces. Military bases, complete with schools, churches, stores, child care centers, and recreational areas, became never-to-be-left islands of tranquility removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden environment outside the gates.  As one reporter put it in 1991: "Increasingly isolated from mainstream America, today's troops tend to view the civilian world with suspicion and sometimes hostility."  Thus, a physically isolated and intellectually alienated officer corps was paired with an enlisted force likewise distanced from the society it was supposed to serve. In short, the military evolved into a force susceptible to manipulation by an authoritarian leader from its own select ranks.
What made this all the more disheartening was the wretched performance of our forces in the Second Gulf War.  Consumed with ancillary and nontraditional missions, the military neglected its fundamental raison d'etre. As the Supreme Court succinctly put it more than a half century ago, the "primary business of armies and navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."  When Iranian armies started pouring into the lower Gulf states in 2010, the US armed forces were ready to do anything but fight.
Preoccupation with humanitarian duties, narcotics interdiction, and all the rest of the peripheral missions left the military unfit to engage an authentic military opponent. Performing the new missions sapped resources from what most experts agree was one of the vital ingredients to victory in the First Gulf War: training. Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spent performing a nontraditional mission is one unavailable for orthodox military exercises. We should have recognized the grave risk. In 1991 The Washington Post reported that in "interview after interview across the services, senior leaders and noncommissioned officers stressed that they cannot be ready to fight without frequent rehearsals of perishable skills." 
The military's anti-drug activities were a big part of the problem. Oh sure, I remember the facile claims of exponents of the military's counternarcotics involvement as to what "valuable" training it provided.  Did anyone really think that crew members of an AWACS  -- an aircraft designed to track high-performance military aircraft in combat -- significantly improved their skills by hours of tracking slow-moving light planes? Did they seriously imagine that troops enhanced combat skills by looking for marijuana under car seats? Did they truly believe that crews of the Navy's sophisticated antiair and anti-submarine ships received meaningful training by following lumbering trawlers around the Caribbean?  Tragically, they did.
The problem was exacerbated when political pressures  exempted the Guard and the Reserves from the harshest effects of the budgetary cutbacks of the early 1990s. The First Gulf War demonstrated that modern weapons and tactics were simply too complex for part-time soldiers to master  during their allotted drill periods, however well motivated.  Still, creative Guard and Reserve defenders contrived numerous civic-action and humanitarian assignments and sold them as "training."  Left unexplained was how such training was supposed to fit with military strategies that contemplated short, violent,  come-as-you-are  expeditionary wars.  Nice-to-have Guard and Reserve support-oriented programs prevailed at the expense of critical active-duty combat capabilities. 
Perhaps even more damaging than the diversion of resources was the assault on the very ethos of military service. Rather than bearing in mind the Supreme Court's admonition to focus on warfighting, the military was told to alter its purpose. Former Secretary of State James Baker typified the trendy new tone in remarks about the military's airlift of food and medicine to the former Soviet republics in early 1992.  He said the airlift would "vividly show the peoples of the former Soviet Union that those that once prepared for war with them now have the courage and the conviction to use their militaries to say, `We will wage a new peace.'" 
In truth militaries ought to "prepare for war" and leave the "peace waging" to those agencies of government whose mission is just that. Nevertheless, such pronouncements -- seconded by military leaders  -- became the fashionable philosophy. The result? People in the military no longer considered themselves warriors. Instead, they perceived themselves as policemen, relief workers, educators, builders, health care providers, politicians -- everything but warfighters. When these philanthropists met the Iranian 10th Armored Corps near Daharan during the Second Gulf War, they were brutally slaughtered by a military which had not forgotten what militaries were supposed to do or what war is really all about.
The devastation of the military's martial spirit was exemplified by its involvement in police activities. Inexplicably, we ignored the deleterious effect on combat motivation suffered by the Israeli Defense Forces as a result of their efforts to police the West Bank and Gaza.  Few seemed to appreciate the fundamental difference between the police profession and the profession of arms.  As Richard J. Barnet observed in The New Yorker, "The line between police action and a military operation is real. Police derive their power from their acceptance as 'officers of the law'; legitimate authority, not firepower, is the essential element." 
Police organizations are understandably oriented toward the studied restraint necessary for the end sought: a judicial conviction. As one Drug Enforcement Administration agent noted: "The military can kill people better than we can [but] when we go to a jungle lab, we're not there to move onto the target by fire and maneuver to destroy the enemy. We're there to arrest suspects and seize evidence."  If military forces are inculcated with the same spirit of restraint, combat performance is threatened.  Moreover, law enforcement is also not just a form of low-intensity conflict. In low-intensity conflict, the military aim is to win the will of the people, a virtually impossible task with criminals "motivated by money, not ideology." 
Humanitarian missions likewise undermined the military's sense of itself. As one Navy officer gushed during the 1991 Bangladesh relief operation, "It's great to be here doing the opposite of a soldier."  While no true soldier relishes war, the fact remains that the essence of the military is warfighting and preparation for the same. What journalist Barton Gellman has said of the Army can be extrapolated to the military as a whole: it is an "organization whose fighting spirit depends . . . heavily on tradition."  If that tradition becomes imbued with a preference for "doing the opposite of a soldier," fighting spirit is bound to suffer. When we first heard editorial calls to "pacify the military" by involving it in civic projects,  we should have given them the forceful rebuke they deserved.
Military analyst Harry Summers warned back in '91 that when militaries lose sight of their purpose, catastrophe results. Citing a study of pre-World War II Canadian military policy as it related to the subsequent battlefield disasters, he observed that:
Instead of using the peacetime interregnum to hone their military skills, senior Canadian military officers sought out civilian missions to justify their existence. When war came they were woefully unprepared. Instead of protecting their soldiers' lives they led them to their deaths.
In today's post- old War peacetime environment, this trap again looms large. . . . Some today within the US military are also searching for relevance, with draft doctrinal manuals giving touchy-feely prewar and postwar civil operations equal weight with warfighting. This is an insidious mistake. We must remember that America's position at the end of the Cold War had no historical precedent. For the first time the nation -- in peacetime -- found itself with a still-sizable, professional military establishment that was not preoccupied with an overarching external threat.  Yet the uncertainties in the aftermath of the Cold War limited the extent to which those forces could be safely downsized. When the military was then obliged to engage in a bewildering array of nontraditional duties to further justify its existence, it is little wonder that its traditional apolitical professionalism eventually eroded.
Clearly, the curious tapestry of military authoritarianism and combat ineffectiveness that we see today was not yet woven in 1992. But the threads were there. Knowing what I know now, here's the advice I would have given the War College Class of 1992:
1. Demand that the armed forces focus exclusively on indisputably military duties. We must not diffuse our energies away from our fundamental responsibility for warfighting. To send ill-trained troops into combat makes us accomplices to murder. 
2. Acknowledge that national security does have economic, social, educational, and environmental dimensions, but insist that this doesn't necessarily mean the problems in those areas are the responsibility of the military to correct. Stylishly designating efforts to solve national ills as "wars" doesn't convert them into something appropriate for the employment of military forces.
3. Readily cede budgetary resources to those agencies whose business it is to address the non- military issues the armed forces are presently asked to fix. We are not the DEA, EPA, Peace Corps, Department of Education, or Red Cross -- nor should we be. It has never been easy to give up resources, but in the long term we -- and the nation -- will be better served by a smaller but appropriately focused military.
4. Divest the defense budget of perception-skewing expenses. Narcotics interdiction, environmental cleanup, humanitarian relief, and other costs tangential to actual combat capability should be assigned to the budgets of DEA, EPA, State, and so forth. As long as these expensive programs are hidden in the defense budget, the taxpayer understandably -- but mistakenly -- will continue to believe he's buying military readiness.
5. Continue to press for the elimination of superfluous, resource-draining Guard and Reserve units. Increase the training tempo, responsibilities, and compensation of those that remain.
6. Educate the public to the sophisticated training requirements occasioned by the complexities of modern warfare. It's imperative we rid the public of the misperception that soldiers in peacetime are essentially unemployed and therefore free to assume new missions.
7. Resist unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also because unification would be inimical to the checks and balances that underpin democratic government. Slow the pace of fiscally driven consolidation so that the impact on less quantifiable aspects of military effectiveness can be scrutinized.
8. Reduce officer accessions from the service academies to correspond with overall force reductions, but maintain separate service academies. Keep ROTC on a wide diversity of campuses; if necessary, resort to litigation to do so.
9. Without compromising standards,  orient recruiting resources and campaigns toward ensuring that all echelons of society are represented in the military Accept that this kind of recruiting may increase costs. It's worth it.
10. Where possible, end the base-as-an-island syndrome by providing improved incentives for military members to live in civilian communities. Foster a 'citizen soldier' attitude among the full-time professional soldiers of the increasingly U.S. based All-Volunteer Force. [Added to later draft: Within the information programs for our force of all-volunteer professionals (increasingly US-based), strengthen the emphasis upon such themes as the inviolability of the Constitution, ascendancy of our civilian leadership over the military, and citizens' responsibilities.]
Finally, I would tell our classmates that democracy is a fragile institution that must be continuously nurtured and scrupulously protected. I would also tell them that they must speak out when they see the institution threatened; indeed, it is their duty to do so. Richard Gabriel aptly observed in his book To Serve with Honor that :
[W]hen one discusses dissent, loyalty, and the limits of military obligations, the central problem is that the military represents a threat to civil order not because it will usurp authority, but because it does not speak out on critical policy decisions. The soldier fails to live up to his oath to serve the country if he does not speak out when he sees his civilian or military superiors executing policies he feels to be wrong. 
Gabriel was wrong when he dismissed the military's potential to threaten civil order, but he was right when he described our responsibilities. The catastrophe that occurred on our watch took place because we failed to speak out against policies we knew were wrong. It's too late for me to do any more. But it's not for you.
Intelligence Analysis: Annotations
1. These acts violate Articles 134 and 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), Manual for Courts-Martial. United States (Washington: GPO, 1984) Part IV, Paragraphs 12 and 72.
2. The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that in the case of "death ... the Vice President shall become the President." But Section 1 of Article II requires the taking of the oath before "enter(ing] the Execution of his Office ..."
3. The quote is by Daniel J. Boorstin in "History's Hidden Turning Points," U.S. News & World Report 22 April 1991: 52.
4. One newspaper editor put it this way:
Crime rages on. Schools deteriorate. Roads and bridges crumble. The homeless huddle in our parks and doorways. Oil spills daily and unnoticed into waters that produce seafood and recreation. The level of U.S. public health is shameful for the rich and high tech nation.
Ernest B. Furgeson, "Can-Do vs. Won't Do," The Baltimore Sun 6 March 1991: 11.
5. A coup d'etat is defined as the "overthrow of a constituted government by a small clique, usually formed within the country's armed forces. Coups are rarely bloody, because one side or the other usually capitulates without fighting ..." Edward Luttwak and Stuart L. Koehl, eds., The Dictionary of Modem War (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 147.
6. Oliver Stone's movie, JFK, is one example. See Joel Achenbach, "JFK Conspiracy: Myth vs. Facts," The Washington Post 28 February 1992: C5.
7. See Len Colodny and Robert Gettlin, Silent Coup (New York: St. Martin's, 1991).
8. George Washington in his "Farewell Address" dated September 19, 1796 counseled: "[O]vergrown military establishments ... under any form of government are inauspicious to liberty and ... are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty." As quoted in The Annals of America (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1976) 609.
9. Author Geoffrey Pertet expressed the traditional view as follows:
"The antimilitaristic side of the American character is forever on guard. Americans are so suspicious of military ambition that even when the armed forces win wars they are criticized as robustly as if they had lost them."
A Country Made By War (New York: Vintage, 1989) 560.
10. One example of the American tradition is related by columnist Art Buchwald:
I was at the White House that night to hear [President Nixon's] resignation speech, and what impressed me more than anything else was that while one leader of our country was resigning and another was taking his place, I did not see one tank or one helmeted soldier in the street and the only uniforms I saw that night were two motorcycle policeman who were directing traffic on Pennsylvania Avenue.
Art Buchwald as quoted in Words on War, Jay M. Shafritz, ed., Prentice, 1990) 58.
11. Andrew C. Janos, "The Seizure of Power: A Study of Force and Popular Consent," Research Monograph No.16, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 39.
12. Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1991 (New York: Pharo Books, 1990) 426.
13. Royce Crocker, Voter Registration and Turnout 1948-1988, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Report No. 89-179 GOV (Washington: CRS, 1989) 11.
14. Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1991 (New York: Pharo Books, 1990) 426.
15. E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Altered States: The Union & the Campaign," The Washington Post 26 January 1992: C1.
16. Fordham University researcher Marc Miringoff reports that the Index of Social Indicators fell to its lowest point in 20 years. He describes the Index, which is a amalgamation of social and economic data from government sources, as "sort of a Dow Jones of the national soul." See Paul Taylor, "'Dow Jones of the National Soul' Sours, " The Washington Post 16 January 1992: A25.
17. That frustration was the cause, according to columnist George F. Will, of a rising level of collective "national stress." George F. Will, "Stressed Out in America," The Washington Post 16 January 1992: A27. Another essayist described America's querulous state as the "Fraying of America." Robert Hughes, "The Fraying of America," Time 3 February 1992: 44.
18. Columnist Charles Krauthammer asserted that "America is in a foul mood." See "America's Case of the Sulks," The Washington Post 19 January 1992: C7.
19. A 1989 Harris poll revealed that 53% of Americans believed that Congress was not effectively fulfilling its responsibilities. See Robert R. Ivany, "Soldiers and Legislators: Common Mission," Parameters Spring 1991: 47.
20. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Behind Our Loss of Faith," U.S. News & World Report 16 March 1992: 76. Many believed that democracy's promise didn't include them. 91% of Americans reported that, the "group with too little influence in government is people like themselves." See "Harper's Index," Harper's Magazine January 1991: 17.
21. David Finkle, "The Greatest Democracy on Earth," The Washington Post Magazine 16 February 1992: 16.
22. 43% of those that did vote didn't see any important differences between the two major parties. See "Harper's Index," Harper's Magazine March 1992: 13.
23. One in eight Americans was so pessimistic as to conclude that the country's domestic problems were "beyond solving." "Harper's Index," Harper's Magazine October 1991: 15.
24. In his book Coup d'Etat Edward Luttwak makes a similar point when he lists as one of his preconditions for a successful coup that "the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population." Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (New York: Knopf, 1969) 24.
25. A ten-year rise in public confidence was reported by Tom Morganthau, et al., in "The Military's New Image, " Newsweek 11 March 1991: 50.
26. A White House planner James P. Pinkerton explained: "More than any other institution in the federal government, the Pentagon studied its failures, learned from them and reformed. As quoted by E.J. Dionne, Jr., "Martial Metaphors," The Washington Post 27 March 1991: A21.
27. As columnist Judy Mann put it shortly after the beginning of the air campaign:
The armed services have been badly stung by the war in Vietnam, the Iranian hostage rescue failure, the invasion of Grenada and the arms procurement scandals. On Wednesday night they redeemed 20 years of bad history in less than five hours.
Judy Mann, "The Military Finally Wins One With a Technical Triumph," The Washington Post 18 January 1991: D3.
28. A survey of the 163 new Army brigadier generals revealed that their IQ was in the 92nd percentile of the population. See Bruce W. Nelan, "Revolution in Defense," Time 18 March 1991: 25.
29. In many instances the curriculum vitae of military personnel was more impressive than that of their civilian counterparts. For example, over 88% of brigadier generals had an advanced degree compared with 19% of top civilian business leaders. See David Gergen, "America's New Heroes," 76. Similarly, 97% of enlisted personnel were high school graduates, the highest percentage ever. See Grant Willis, "DoD: Recruits in '91 best educated, most qualified," Air Force Times 27 January 1992; 14.
30. For example, the "military had become practically a drug-free workplace." See David Gergen, "Bringing Home the Storm, " The Washington Post 28 April 1991: C2. Military sociologist Charles Moskos explained that the reason for the great decline in disciplinary problems in the military is "simply better recruits." Peter Slavin, "Telling it like it is," Air Force Times 14 March 1988: 60.
31. Ivany 47.
32. David Gergen, "America's New Heroes," US News & World Report 11 February 1991: 76.
33. See Grant Willis, "A new generation of warriors, " Navy Times 16 March 1991: 12.
34. 408 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
35. At least one observer sensed the peril which arises when power and respect converge in the military:
Our warriors are kinder and gentler, and have not shown the slightest inclination to lust for political power. But that potential always lurks where power and respect converge, and the degree of military influence in society is something to watch carefully in the years ahead.
Martin Anderson, "The Benefits of the Warrior Class, " The Baltimore Sun 14 April 1991: 3F.
36. James Fallows, "Military Efficiency," August 1991: 18.
37. Civilian law enforcement agencies were intercepting only 15% of the drugs entering the country. See U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1981) 1785.
38. Public Law 97-86 (1981) codified in 10 U.S.C. 371 et seq.
39. Newsweek reports: " [T]he Pentagon resisted the [counternarcotics] mission for decades, saying that the military should fight threats to national security, and the police should fight crime." Charles Lane, "The Newest War," Newsweek 6 January 1992: 18.
40. See U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1981) 1785.
41. 10 U.S.C. 1385.
42. The original purpose of the Posse Comitatus act was to restrain Federal troops that had become deeply involved in law enforcement in the post-Civil War South -- even in areas where civil government had been reestablished. See U.S. v. Hartley, 486 F.Supp. 1348, 1356 fn. 11 (M.D. Fla. 1980). The statute imposes criminal penalties for the improper uses of the military in a domestic law enforcement matters. Though technically applying only to the Army and Air Force, by regulation it also governed the Navy. See U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1981) 1786.
43. Additional amendments were added in 1988. See Public Law 100-456 (1988) .
44. Although anti-drug spending will decrease in FY 93, the rate of decline is slower than that of the DoD budget as a whole. See William Matthews, "Counternarcotics request increased," Air Force Times 24 February 1992: 2.
45. Lane, "Newest War, " 18.
46. "Combatting Drugs," National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1992) 15.
47. Some were suggesting the need for greater military authority in 1992. See Dale E. Brown, "Drugs on the Border: The Role of the Military," Winter 1991-92: 58-59.
48. For example, in 1989 property valued at $13 billion was stolen. John W. Wright, ed., "Crime and Punishment," The Universal Almanac 1992 (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1991) 255.
49. The rise in the rate of violent crime continued a trend begun in the 1980s when such offenses soared by 23%. See John W. Wright, ed., "Crime and Punishment," The Universal Almanac 1992 (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1991) 255.
50. "Harper's Index," Harper's Magazine July 1991: 15.
51. George Will observed that" [u]rban governments are failing to perform their primary function of protecting people from violence on streets and even in homes and schools." George F. Will, "Stressed Out in America, " A27.
52. Using Guardsmen in a law enforcement capacity during riots end other emergencies was not unusual, but a regular presence in a civilian community in that role was unusual in those days. Guard members usually performed law enforcement activities in their status as state employees. This is distinct from their federalized status when they are incorporated into the U.S. military. See U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1988) 2583.
53. K.R. Clark, "Spotlighting the Drug Zone," Pentagram, 30 January 1992: 20-21.
54. Indeed, one of the specific purposes of the DC program was to "work with police to increase the uniformed presence in the neighborhood at night to cut down on illegal activity." See Clark 21.
55. For example, persons over the age of 65 vote at a rate 50% higher than that of the 18-34 age group. See George F. Will, "Stressed Out in America," The Washington Post 16 January 1992: A27.
56. The number of 'baby boomers' in the population is expected to peak in 2020. See Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, "Trends Shaping the World," The Futurist September-October 1991: 12.
57. Persons over 65 were estimated to constitute 18% of the electorate by 2010. This group, together with the 'boomers' over 45 years old, would constitute 53% of the electorate by 2010. These percentages were computed from statistics found in the Universal Almanac 1992, "The U.S. Population by Age," John W. Wright, ed., (Kansas City: Andrews and McMeel, 1991) 207.
58. In 1992 Deidre Fanning wrote in Worth magazine:
[I]n the next ten to fifteen years, the largest intergenerational transfer of wealth in U.S. history (will occur]. Simply put, baby boomers' parents have amassed a lot of money over the years -- a collective $8 trillion according to one economist's estimate, or an average of $100,000 per boomer -- and as they begin to die off, much of it will land in the laps of waiting kids. In the next twenty years ... baby boomers will inherit two-thirds of the nation's wealth.
Deidre Fanning, "Waiting for the Wealth," Worth February/March 1992: 87, 89.
59. A 1990 poll of Americans aged 50 years and older showed that nearly 23% believed that use of the military was the best way to combat the growing problems of drug abuse and crime.
See Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1991 (New York: Pharo Books, 1990) 33.
60. "Plan to Open Veterans Hospitals to Poor is Dropped," New York Times 23 February 1992: 17.
61. Scott Shuger, "Pacify the Military," New York Times 14 March 1992: 25.
62. It was estimated that in 1987, 48 million Americans lacked health insurance for all or part of the year. See Spencer Rich, "Number Lacking Health Insurance Grows," The Washington Post 29 February 1992: A10.
63. Andy Tobias, "Let's Get Moving!" Time 3 February 1992: 41.
64. U.S. News & World Report noted that "a third of the officers leaving the Army are qualified to teach high-school math, and 10 to 20 percent can teach physics." David Gergen, "Heroes For Hire," U.S. News & World Report 27 January 1992: 71.
65. U.S. school children ranked near the bottom in math and science skills in an international survey. See "Battle of the Brains," U.S. News & World Report 17 February 1992: 10.
66. For example, a District of Columbia National Guard unit entered into a "Partnership in Education" agreement with a local school district. Under the memorandum the Guard agreed to "institute a cooperative learning center providing tutoring in science, English, mathematics and other basic subjects." See "Guard enters partnership with school," 13 February 1992: 3. Likewise, in December 1991 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency announced a "partnership" with Arlington (VA) schools. Under the agreement the Defense agency would provide "occasional access to its facilities, [and] will supply guest lecturers, mentoring and internship opportunities for students." "Arlington Schools Join Forces With Defense Department Agency," The Washington Post 12 December 1991: VA1.
67. The DoD budget for environmental clean-up for FY 93 was $3.7 billion. Anne Garfinkle, "Going Home is Hard to Do," Wall Street Journal 27 January 1992: 12. There were 17,482 contaminated military sites in the U.S. See Michael Weisskopf, "3,000 Military Base Sites Added to Toxic Cleanup List," The Washington Post 29 March 1991: A4.
68. It was predicted that DoD's bill for environmental clean-up could "range from $20 billion on up." See Peter Grier, "US Defense Department Declares War on Colossal Pollution Problem," Christian Science Monitor 2 March 1992: 9.
69. At least one service saw this activity as a "vital mission" as early as 1991. The National Journal reported:
Outside the Storm, a pamphlet heralding the Army's post-Persian Gulf war "vital missions and important work, " touches on the war on drugs and "protecting the planet Earth" (even reprinting a syrupy ode to environmentalism from the 1989 Sierra Club Wilderness Calendar) .
David C. Morrison, "Operation Kinder and Gentler," National Journal 25 May 1991: 1260.
70. In February 1992 Trans World Airlines became the eighth major airline to go bankrupt since 1989. Martha M. Hamilton, "Trans World Airlines Files for Bankruptcy," The Washington Post 1 February 1992: C2.
71. By 1992 U.S.-flagged commercial shipping had virtually disappeared. See James Bovard, "The Antiquated 1920 Jones Act Slowly Sinks U.S. Shipping, " Insight 6 January 1992: 21.
72. In the wake of Desert Storm, $3.1 billion was spent to build and convert ships for the military's cargo fleet. Michael Blood, "An idea to use shipyard as a U.S. sealift base," Philadelphia Inquirer 16 February 1992: B-1.
73. The precedent for 'leasing' military resources can be traced to 1992. Just such an arrangement occurred in Germany following reunification. The Air Force Times reported it this way:
A shortage of German [air] controllers and their unfamiliarity with newly reunified Berlin's busy skies prompted Germany to hire a squadron from the U.S. Air Force at a cost of $35 million for four years ... It is the only U.S. military unit that guides civilian air traffic on foreign soil ...
Soraya S. Nelson, "AF controllers in Berlin keep eye on civilian sky," Air Force Times 10 February 1992: 22.
74. See Shuger 25. Similarly, noting the growing obsolescence of the Guard's combat role, a National Guard officer proposed an alternative:
[T]he National Guard can provide a much greater service to the nation by seeking more combat support and combat service support missions and the structure to support them. Such units can participate in nation building or assistance missions throughout the world, to include the United States ... Much of our national infrastructure, streets, bridges, health care, water and sewer lines, to name just a few, particularly in the inner cities of the United States, are in disrepair. Many of the necessary repairs could be accomplished by National guard units on a year-round training basis.
Colonel Philip Drew, "Taking the National Guard Out of Combat," National Guard April 1991: 38.
75. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Forces Find Work As Angels Of Mercy, " New York Times 12 January 1992: E3.
76. Small scale civic projects are a custom for U.S. forces in overseas locations. For example, the U.S. Navy traditionally does a community project at its ports of call. See e.g. "U.S. sailors in gulf perform community projects," European Stars & Stripes 3 January 1992: 8. See also Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," Survival September/October 1991: 452- 54.
77. See the legislative history of Public Law 99-661, U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1986) 6482.
78. Public Law 99-661 codified in 10 U.S.C. 401 et seq.
79. Ken Adelman, "Military helping hands," Washington Times 8 July 1991: D3.
80. Bruce B. Auster with Robin Knight, "The Pentagon Scramble to Stay Relevant," U.S. News & World Report December 30, 1991/6 January 1992: 52.
81. It was predicted that the AIDS epidemic would hit Africa especially hard with infection rates in some cities as high as 40% by the year 2000. See Marvin J. Cetron and Owen Davies, "Trends Shaping the World," The Futurist September-October 1991: 12.
82. Some experts predicted that African famine might present an opportunity for a military humanitarian mission. Weiss and Campbell 451-452.
83. Richard H.P. Sia, "U.S. increasing its special forces activity in Africa," Baltimore Sun 15 March 1992: 1.
84. Such long-term military commitments to humanitarian operations were recommended by some experts. See Weiss and Campbell 457.
85. U.S. troops assigned to African countries in the early 1990s were tasked to "help improve local health-care and economic conditions." See Sia 1. Similarly, the notion of using the expertise of U.S. military personnel to perform governmental functions in foreign countries was also suggested in the 1990s. For example, when the food distribution system in the former Soviet Union broke down during the winter of 1991-92, there were calls for Lt General Gus Pagonis, the logistical wizard of the First Gulf War, to be dispatched to take charge of the system. See "A Man Who Knows How," editorial, The Los Angeles Times 5 February 1992: 10. An even more striking example occurred in Germany following reunification. The Air Force Times reported that Germany hired a U.S. Air Force squadron to provide air traffic control for four years for civilian aircraft over Berlin at a cost of $35 million. Soraya S. Nelson, "AF controllers in Berlin keep eye on civilian sky," Air Force Times 10 February 1992: 22.
86. As quoted in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., ed. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966)245.
87. Public Law 99-433 (1986). The function of the Chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff is essentially as follows:
Under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the chairman was given much broader powers. Not only is he now the primary military advisor to the president, but he is responsible for furnishing strategic direction to the armed forces, strategic and contingency planning, establishing budget priorities, and developing joint doctrine for all four services.
Edward Luttwak and Stuart L. Koehl, eds., The Dictionary of Modem War (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 320.
88. The law also mandated that joint duty be a requirement for promotion to flag rank. See Vincent Davis, "Defense Reorganization and National Security," The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science September 1991: 163-165. This facilitated development of a senior military cliques which transcended service lines.
89. The First Gulf War was not a true test of either Goldwater-Nichols or joint warfare. All that conflict demonstrated was that poorly trained and miserably led conscript armies left unprotected from air attack will collapse under the weight of massive air strikes. CBS news analyst Harry Smith observed: "The Iraqi military machine folded under the pressure of Allied smart bombs and air power." As quoted in Reaching Globally. Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington: United States Air Force, 1991) 52. One commentator made the point similarly:
[T]he most obvious lesson of Desert Storm may well be that a resource-superior, professional force with adequate numbers, ample time to deploy and train, and inviolable rear areas and supply lines can defeat an overextended conscript hoard.
Philip Gold, "After the Storm, Back to Quieter Military Perils," Insight 25 March 1991: 12. Clearly, the decisive fighting was done from the air. For example, British military historian John Keegan concluded that in the Gulf War "air forces played the decisive part." John Keegan, "How The War Was Won," The Washington Post 3 March 1991: C7. Similarly, military analyst (and retired Army colonel) David C. Hackworth determined that "air power did a most impressive job and virtually won this war by itself." David Hackworth, "Lessons of a Lucky War," Newsweek 11 March 1991: 49. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney asserted that "the air campaign was decisive." As quoted in Reaching Globally. Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington: United States Air Force, 1991) 52. Furthermore, the bulk of the air campaign was carried out by a single service. Air Force aircraft delivered 72% of the bomb tonnage dropped during the campaign. See Reaching Globally. Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War (Washington: United States Air Force, 1991) 28.
90. Many praised Goldwater-Nichols as the source of success in the First Gulf war. See e.g. "Persian Gulf war's unsung hero," editorial, Charleston S.C.. News & Courier 4 April 1991: 6. See also Sam Nunn, "Military reform paved way for gulf triumph," Atlanta Constitution 31 March 1991: G5.
91. One study concluded that because of Powell's background he was "especially well qualified" for the politically sensitive role as CJCS. See Preston Niblock, ed., Managing Military Operations in Crises (Santa Monica: BAND, 1991) 51.
92. Representative Denton stated as to Goldwater-Nichols:
This legislation proposes to reverse 200 years of American history by, for the first time, designating by statute .... a single uniformed officer as the "Principal Military Advisor" to the President. That change in the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is profound in its implications.
Similar proposals have been specifically and overwhelmingly rejected in the past -- in 1947, 1949, 1958 -- on the grounds that, in a democracy, no single military officer, no matter what his personal qualifications, should have such power ...
U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1986) 2248.
93. See e.g. Robert Previdi, Civilian Control versus Military Rule (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988) .
94. In The Federalist No. 51 the Founding Fathers warned against the folly of constructing a governmental system based on assumptions about the character of individuals who might occupy a office. See Note 98, infra.
95. William Matthews, "Nunn: Merge the services? Air Force Times 9 March 1992: 6.
96. This brief can be traced to Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the United States," dated 1 November 1991. It states (at page iii) that warfare is essential to victory." While joint warfare might usually be essential to victory, it cannot be said that it is essential in every instance. For example, rebels -- composed entirely of irregular infantry defeated massive Soviet combined-arms forces in Afghanistan without the benefit of any air or naval forces. See also Note 88, infra.
97. See e.g. Col Arthur C. Forster, Jr., "The essential need for an independent Air Force," Air Force Times 7 May 1990: 25.
99. The full quote is as follows:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition ... It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls would be necessary ... This policy, by supplying opposite and rival interests, the defeat of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs.
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist reprinted in the Great Books of the Western World, Robert M. Hutchins, ed., (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 163.
100. Shakespeare called ambition "the soldier's virtue." Antony and Cleopatra, Act III, Scene 1, as reprinted in the Great Books of the Western World, Robert M. Hutchins, ed., Vol. 27, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) 327.
101. Service unification ended the "creative tension" between the services. Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's described the value of this kind of tension in discussing his criticism of the "unified" Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff occasioned by Goldwater-Nichols. Lehman contended that:
Franklin Roosevelt ... wanted to hear Admiral King argue with Marshall in front of him. He wanted to hear McArthur argue against Nimitz, and the Air Corps against the Army, and the Navy against all in his presence, so that he would have the option to make the decisions of major strategy in war. He knew that any political leader, no matter how strong, if given only one military position, finds it nearly impossible to go against it. Unfortunately ...[n]ow the president does not get: to hear arguments from differing points of view.
John Lehman, "U.S. Defense Policy Annals of the American Academy of September 1991: 199- 200.
102. Samuel Huntington explained this concept in The Soldier and the State:
If the officer corps is originally divided into land, sea and air elements, and then is unified under the leadership of a single, overall staff and military commander in chief, this change will tend to increase its authority with regard to other institutions of government. It will speak with one voice instead of three. Other groups will not be able to playoff one of the Officer corps against another.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard, 1959) 87.
103. Despite the Gulf War, defense outlays were scheduled by 1997 to shrink to their lowest percentage of the federal budget since the end of World War II. Sara Collins, "Cutting Up the Military," U.S. News & World Report 10 February 1992: 29.
104. When a Pentagon planning document containing possible future threats was leaked to the press, the scenarios "drew ridicule from critics on Capital Hill and among national security officials outside the Pentagon." See Barton Gellman, "Debate on Military's Future Crystallizes Around 'Enemies List,'" The Washington Post 26 February 1992: A20.
105. See e.g. John Lancaster, "Aspin Seeks to Double Bush's Defense Cuts," The Washington Post, 27 February 1992: A16; and Helen Dewar, "Bush Michell Take Aim At Slashing the Defense Budget," The Washington Post, 17 January 1992: B1.
106. Bruce B. Auster with Robin Knight, "The Pentagon Scramble to Stay Relevant," U.S. New & World Report, December 30, 1991/6 January 1992: 52.
107. Morrison 1260.
108. Military analyst Harry Summers insists that ROTC is a key reason military coups have not occurred in the U.S. as they have in other countries. He notes:
ROTC was designed to produce a well-rounded officer corps inculcated with the principals of freedom, democracy and American values through close contact with civilian students on an open college campus, and through a liberal education taught by a primarily civilian academic faculty. And that's just what has happened.
See Harry Summers, "Stalking the wrong quarry, "Washington Times, 7 December 1989: F-3.
109. The Army plans to cut ROTC officer acquisitions from 7,778 in 1990 to 5,200 in 1995. See Peter Copeland, "ROTC more selective in post-Cold War era," The Washington Times, 27 May 1991: 3.
110. David Wood, "A Breed Apart, Volunteer army grows distant from society," The Star Ledger (Newark, N.J.) 24 April 1991: 1.
111. The armed services will shrink by 25% by 1995. See Richard Cheney, "U.S. defense strategy for an era of uncertainty," International Defense Review 1992: 7. But service academy graduates are expected to decline by only 10% during the same period. See Eric Schmitt, "Service Academies Grapple With Cold War Thaw, " New York Times 3 March 1992: 12.
112. For example, the Los Angeles Times reported in its 25 March 1992 edition that:
Just after the Vietnam War, West Point was supplying about 8% of new Army officers, compared to the current 24%, a new study by the congressional General Accounting Office (GAO) suggests. To roll back the officer stream from West Point, the GAO says, enrollment might have to be limited to 2,500 cadets, a 40% drop from today.
Larry Gordon, "Changing Cadence at West Point," Los Angeles Times 25 March 1992: 1.
113. Lt Col Mitchell M. Zais, USA, "West Point: Sword Making or Swordsmanship?" Armed Forces Journal International March 1990: 57.
114. Fred Reed, "Military academies fail at war training, " Air Force Times 19 February 1990: 62.
115. One retired general officer offered this critique of the service academy experience:
Four years of mental manipulation affects a person's thinking for the next 30 years ... Can you take an impressionable teenager, limit his exposure so he sees his country only on weekends, and have him come out with what we might call a 'national mind' reflective of the values and priorities of the nation itself?
The worst thing that can happen to a country in transition is to have a small elitist group of traditionalists, and that four-year passage through the academy establishes an elitist group for all time ....
As quoted by David Evans, "A New Way to Train Military Officers," Baltimore Sun 18 February 1992: 7.
116. Military analyst David Hackworth recommended unification of the service academies in order to "bond young officers into a one service attitude early in their careers." See David Hackworth, "A Pentagon Dreamland," The Washington Post 23 February 1992: C3.
117. See e.g. Tom Philip, "CSUS May End ROTC Over Anti-Gay Policy," Sacramento Bee, 15 February 1992: 1.
118. As of November 1991, 89 law schools prohibit or restrict on-campus military recruiting. See "Sexual Preference Issue," HQ USAF/JAX Professional Development Update November 1991: 9. Such bans are not legal in most cases. See 10 U.S.C. 2358; and U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986) .
119. Furthermore, by condoning the exclusion of military recruiters from campuses -- billed as 'marketplaces of ideas' -- these universities legitimized censorship of "politically incorrect" views. As politicization of the armed forces became the "politically correct" posture in the early years of the 21st century, the exponents of political correctness of the 1990s found themelves banned from many campuses and other organizations.
120. Additionally, author Nicholas Lemann argued in 1992 that members of America's "new ruling class," which he called the "Meritocratic Upper Class," are products of the nation's finest schools but "they don't serve in the military." Nicholas Lemann, "Curse of The Merit Class," The Washington Post 9 February 1992: B4. One legacy of the AVF was that far fewer civilian policymakers were exposed to the military as had been the case during conscription. See Woody West, "All-Volunteer Force's Liabilities," Insight, 15 October 1990: 64.
121. See e.g. Nolan Walters, "As military shuts door, blacks are hit, " Baltimore Sun 7 February 1992: 1; and Neff Hudson, "Delicate balance," Air Force Times 16 March 1992: 12. In 1991 the percentage of blacks in the military fell to 17% from 21% in 1990. See Grant Willis, "DoD: Recruits in '91 best educated, most qualified," Air Force Times 14. Likewise, some predicted that as the military shrinks, "a historically important path of upward mobility will diminish, and single parents also eventually may be excluded from the service." See e.g. Dana Priest, "Measuring Up or Mustering Out," The Washington Post 8 December 1991: A26.
122. Grant Willis, "DoD says recruits aren't drawn from the 'underclass,"' Air Force Times 31 December 1990: 4.
123. Grant Willis, "DoD says recruits aren't drawn from the 'underclass, "' 16.
124. See "The Shriveling Middle Class," U.S. News & World Report 2 March 1992: 12. The report predicts that the middle class will shrink during the 1990s while percentages of both rich and poor will grow. When the military sought to use recruiting ads to help broaden its sociological base, Congress criticized. See John Lancaster, "Seeking 'the Few' When Too Many Exist," The Washington Post 10 February 1992: A9.
125. Time, reported a survey which showed that, given a choice, 57% of women would stay at home and care for their families rather than hold an outside job. In 1985, only 49% would prefer to stay at home. See Ann Blackman, et al., "The War Against Feminism, Time, 9 March 1992: 55.
126. US News & World Report observed that "enlistments last longer .. and re-enlistments are up. As a result, enlistees stay in their units long enough to bond with their compatriots." See David Gergen, "America's New Heroes, " US News & World Report 11 February 1991: 76.
127. For example, in 1989 the Department of Defense spent $4.9 billion on family programs. Bill Torque and Douglas Waller, "Warriors Without War," Newsweek 19 March 1990: 18.
128. An article by journalist David Wood grasped this trend. He quoted an Army officer as stating "we are isolated -- we don't have a lot of exposure to the outside world." Wood goes on to observe:
The nation's 2 million active duty soldiers are a self-contained society, one with its own solemn rituals, its own language, its own system of justice, and even its own system of keeping time ... Only a decade ago, life within the confines of a military base might have seemed a spartan existence. But improving the garrison life has been a high priority. As a result, many bases have come to resemble an ideal of small-town America ... There is virtually no crime or poverty. Drug addicts and homeless are mere rumors from the outside.
David Wood, "Duty, Honor, Isolation: Military more and more a force unto itself," The Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.) 21 April 1991: 1. Similarly, another writer described the cohesiveness of most military communities:
Military families are accustomed to living on-base, or close to it. They socialize with their squadrons and platoons, neighboring spouses comfort one another during deployments, and "military brats" have friends down the street with similar experiences.
Laura Elliot, "Behind the Lines," The Washingtonian April 1991: 160.
129. Wood 1.
130. Studies indicate that defeat in war may actually increase the likelihood of a military coup. Ekkart Zimmermann, "Toward a Causal Model of Military Coups d'Etat," Armed Forces and Society Spring 1979: 399.
131. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17, 76 S.Ct. 1 (1955) .
132. Barton Gellman, "Strategy for the '90s: Reduce Size and Preserve Strength," The Washington Post 9 December 1991: A10.
133. See e.g. Brown 50.
134. "AWACS" is an acronym for "Airborne Warning and Control System."
135. According to one report, the effort was futile and wasteful: "We're getting so little of the drug traffic for such a great expenditure of effort," lamented one Navy officer. "We're pouring money into the ocean, at a time when resources are scarce," he said." William Matthews, "Drug war funds would shrink under budget proposal," Air Force Times 17 February 1992.
136. The Washington Post reported that proposals to cut Guard and reserve funding "inflame passions on Capitol Hill" causing Congress to resist cutting the part-time forces. John Lancaster, "Pentagon Cuts Hill-Favored Targets," The Washington Post 24 January 1992: A6. The Los Angeles Times reported that the Guard and reserves "exercise stunning political power and influence, both among state and local governments and in the power centers of Washington." It also quoted Brookings Institute expert Martin Binkin as saying that the Guard/reserve lobby "makes the gun lobby led by the National Rifle Association look like amateurs." Art Pine, "In Defense of 2nd Line Defenders," Los Angeles Times 13 March 1992: 1.
137. Former Director of Operations for the Joint Staff Lt General Thomas Kelly believed there was simply not enough training time to keep Guard units ready for the kind of highly complex warfare the Army now conducts. He said "There is nothing on earth harder to teach than the maneuver function in combat." As quoted by Grant Willis, "A new generation of warriors," Navy Times 16 March 1991: 12.
138. The motivation of some Guardsmen towards fulfilling their military responsibilities was called into question when up to 80% of the Guardsmen in California units called-up for Desert Storm reported for duty unable to meet physical fitness standards. Steve Gibson, "Guards Flunked Fitness," 18 June 1991: Bl.
139. The former commander of U.S. Southern Command so characterized humanitarian and civic assistance activities. See U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News (St. Paul: West, 1986) 6482.
140. See "Decisive Force, " National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1992) 10.
141. See "Contingency Forces," National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: GPO, 1992) 23.
142. For example, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff Colin Powell testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 January 1992 that the military of the future "would be smaller and more mobile and flexible. Its likely target would be regional conflicts, in which American firepower might still be needed on short notice." As reported by Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Says More Budget Cuts Would Hurt Combat Effectiveness," New York Times 1 February 1992: 9. Similarly, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Merrill A. McPeak stated: "We are moving from a concept of forward deployment to an expeditionary concept ... Our goal is to create a much more agile Air Force that is light on its feet, one that is capable of reacting much more quickly." As quoted by Casey Anderson, "Chief of staff wants leaner force, no air divisions," Air Force Times 17 June 1991: 3.
143. Military analyst and decorated combat veteran David Hackworth sized-up the Guard and reserves as follows: "Except for the air and Marine combat components, these forces aren't worth the billions paid each year to them. The combat service and support units are great, but there are too many of them." Hackworth C3.
144. Operation Provide Hope was a two-week humanitarian aid effort involving 64 U.S. Air Force sorties carrying approximately 4.5 million pounds of food and medicine. Michael Smith, "First of up to 64 relief flights arrives in Kiev," Air Force Times 24 February 1992: 8.
145. As quoted by David Hoffman, "Pentagon to Airlift Aid to Republics," The Washington Post, 24 January 1992: Al.
146. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah, also saw the military's future role in non-combat terms. Stating that there was "no plausible scenario" in which the U.S. would be involved in a military conflict in Europe or with elements of the former Soviet Union, he maintained that the likeliest use of military forces would be to address instability that could arise from migrations by poor peoples of the world to wealthier regions. He envisioned the military's role:
"You would like to deal with this on a political and social level," Jeremiah said.
The military's role should be subtle, he said, similar to the role it plays now in Latin America -- digging wells, building roads and teaching the militaries of host nations how to operate under a democratic system .... When prevention fails, the military can be called to the more active role of running relief operations like the current one at Guatanamo bay, Cuba, for fleeing Haitians.
Operation Provide Comfort, the giant U.S. military rescue mission to save Kurdish refugees who fled from the Iraqi army to the snow-covered mountains of southeastern Turkey last spring, may have been a precursor of what we can look forward to in the next decade if not the next century, Jeremiah said.
As quoted by William Matthews, "Military muscle to shift to humanitarian help," Air Force Times, 6 January 1992: 14.
147. See Leon Hader, Reforming Israel--Before It's Too Late," Foreign Policy, Winter 1990/91: 111.
148. One West Point cadet expressed his reservations about participation in the new law enforcement mission as follows: "I came to West Point to beat up people and countries" said one cadet ... recently, with only a little hyperbole, "not to fly some Piper Cub around the Caribbean looking for druggies." As quoted by Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Strategic Policy in Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era," a paper prepared for the Symposium on Latin America, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 10-12 November 1990: 18.
149. Richard J. Barnet, "Reflections -- The Uses Of Force, " The New Yorker 29 April 1991: 82.
150. Charles Lane, "The Newest War" 18.
151. Newsweek reported the following incident:
When a Marine reconnaissance patrol skirmished with smugglers near the Arizona- Mexico border last December -- firing over their heads to disperse them -- one colonel near retirement age shook his head. He argued that combat-trained Marines shouldn't be diminishing hard-learned skills by squeezing off warning shots. "That teaches some very bad habits, " he said.
Bill Torque and
Douglas Waller, "Warriors Without War," Newsweek, 19 March 1990: 18.
153. As quoted by David Morrison in the National Journal. This relief operation involved 8,000 sailors and marines tasked to help millions of Bangladeshi survivors of a 30 April 1991 cyclone. See Morrison 1260.
154. Barton Gellman, "Strategy for the '90s: Reduce Size and Preserve Strength," The Washington Post 9 December 1991: A10.
155. Shuger 25.
156. Summers goes on to quote Clausewitz:
The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.
See Harry Summers, "When armies lose sight of purpose, " Washington Times 26 December 1991: D3.
157. Eugene J. McCarthy commented on the risks presented by a large military not tempered by an external threat:
Alexis de Tocqueville, in his book Democracy in America, warned of the danger to a democracy of a military establishment that was larger and stronger, more powerful than needed for any immediate or reasonably predictable threat to the country -- one that could become a political force in itself, exercising independent force not only on the military and foreign policy of the country but also on the domestic policy of the society which it was designed to serve -- that it could become a kind of republic within the republic itself.
"Warnings echo from Jefferson to Eisenhower to Desert Storm," USA Today, 1 March 1991: 10A.
158. Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee said: "A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle." As quoted in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Robert Debs Heini, Jr., ed. (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966) 329.
159. A caller to a radio talk show typified this view. She stated that while she appreciated the need for a military in case "something like Iraq came up again, she believed that the military ought to be put to work rebuilding the infrastructure and cleaning up the cities instead of sitting around the barracks." "The Joel Spevak Show, " WRC, Washington, D.C., 11 March 1992. Even low-ranking military personnel are expensive resources to employ. See CMSgt Anthony J. Magaldi, "Managing the $20,000 Airman," Airman, December 1991: 21.
160. One example of the dangers of lowering standards to achieve social goals is "Project 100,000." Conceived as a Great Society program, youths with test scores considered unacceptably low were nevertheless allowed to enter the armed forces during the 1966-1972 period. The idea was to give the disadvantaged poor the chance to obtain education and discipline in the military environment. Author Marilyn Young describes the results:
In its first two years of operation, 41% of those brought into the military through Project 100,000 were black, 80 percent had dropped out of high school, 40 percent could read at less than sixth-grade level, and 37 percent were put directly into combat. Court-martialed at double the usual rate, over eighty thousand of these veterans left the military without the skills and opportunities [Secretary of Defense] McNamara assured them would be theirs, and many of them with service records that would make civilian life far more difficult than if they had never served at all.
See Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars 1945-1990 New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 320.
161. Kichard A. Gabriel, To Serve with Honor (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982) 178.
Military District of
1 July 2012
Subject: United states v. Prisoner 222305759
In the matter of the United States of America v. Prisoner 22305759, the findings and sentence are hereby AFFIRMED.
By the power invested in me as Commander-in-Chief, Unified Armed Forces of the United States, and as Military Plenipotentiary of the United States, I hereby direct that the sentence of DEATH be carried out within seventy-two hours.
Accordingly, the established date of execution is: 4 July 2012
E. Thomas U. Brutus
Photo of Mount
25 July 2012
Please put this photo with the Prisoner 222305759 file. I don't know if it's connected, but this type of graffiti has been showing up all over since the execution. Are you certain we've accounted for all the copies of his letter?
[Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, is the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, US Central Command, at MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a graduate of St. Joseph's University (Pa.), the Villanova University School of Law, and the Armed Forces Staff College, and he is a Distinguished Graduate of the National War College, Class of 1992. He has taught at the Air Force Judge Advocate General's School, and served tours in Korea and the United Kingdom. In 1987 he was a Circuit Military Judge, First Judicial Circuit, and was subsequently assigned to the Air Staff in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Lieutenant Colonel Dunlap was recently named by the Judge Advocates' Association as the USAF's Outstanding Career Armed Services Attorney of 1992. The present article is adapted from his National War College student paper that was co- inner of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1991-92 Strategy Essay Competition, in which students from all the senior service colleges compete.]