INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY-- REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, UNITED STATES SENATE
[Delete] On March 20, 2003, a month before Lt Gen DeLong's request, the United States and its coalition partners had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the initial stages of OIF, conventional ground forces were directed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Combined Joint Task Force 7 CJTF-7 replaced CFLCC in the summer of 2003. As had been the case in Afghanistan, [big delete] deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Iraq to [big delete] 
(U) As previously described, for more than a year after the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the only written guidance for interrogators appears to have been Army Field Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52). When written policies were finally established for interrogators in Afghanistan in January 2003, those policies included some interrogation techniques that were not listed in the Field Manual but had been previously authorized for use at Guantanamo Bay.
(U) By comparISGn, the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq had an interrogation policy in place before the beginning of OIF. This policy was identical to the February 2002 policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Afghanistan and reflected the influence of techniques authorized for use at GTMO.  The first policy to guide interrogations conducted by conventional forces in Iraq, however, was not established until September 2003, more than five months after that war began. That September 2003 policy was also influenced by techniques authorized for use at GTMO.
[Delete] The SMU TF in Iraq [big delete] conducted screening and battlefield interrogations [delete]  SMU TF interrogators questioned detainees for intelligence [big delete].
(U) According to a review completed by the DoD Inspector General in August 2006, the SMU TF based its first interrogation policy on the SOP used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. The DoD Inspector General stated:
At the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the special mission unit forces used a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been developed for operations in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan SOP was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2, 2002. . . and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who were identified as 'unlawful combatants.' 
[Delete] Specifically, in February 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March, the SMU Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy of the interrogation SOP in use by the SMU personnel in Afghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim.  This SOP, which included stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs, governed SMU interrogations in Iraq from the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until it was replaced later that year. 
[Delete] In May 2003, CAPT Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent an email to CENTCOM lawyers stating that CIA General Counsel Scott Muller had called Jim Haynes and told him that the techniques used by military interrogators at the SMU TF facility in Iraq were "more aggressive" than techniques used by CIA to interrogate the same detainees. 
[Delete] The email requested that CENTCOM provide a list of interrogation techniques in use at Bagram in Afghanistan and at the SMU Task Force facility in Iraq. On June 8, 2003, the [delete] Legal Advisor provided CENTCOM with a list of interrogation techniques in use by the SMU TF in Iraq and Afghanistan.  That list included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions (called comfort positions in the memo), sleep management, loud music and light control, and 20 hour interrogations.  [Delete] Legal Advisor did not recall receiving any feedback about the list of interrogation techniques submitted to CENTCOM.  Despite the presence of aggressive techniques in the JSOC Legal Advisor's June 8 memo, on June 10, 2003 CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent a message to the Director of the Joint Staff LTG George Casey stating that "I have confirmed that the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq] and Bagram are conducted using doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF direction." 
[Delete] [delete] A July 15, 2003 SMU interrogation SOP appears to have been the first interrogation policy drafted specifically by the SMU TF in Iraq.  The list of interrogation techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone); presence of military working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music, and light control. 
(U) While the SOP described some techniques as having a "foundation" in Army Field Manual 34-52, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay, who conducted an investigation into the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib, described techniques in the July 15, 2003 SMU SOP as "inconsistent with Army doctrine on detainee treatment or interrogation tactics." 
[Delete] [delete] The July 15, 2003 policy contained the signature block of the SMU TF Commander [big delete] but was unsigned.  [Delete] told the Committee that he did not think he ever approved or even saw an interrogation policy.  He stated, however, that he was aware that the SMU TF used sleep deprivation, loud music, light control, isolation, "comfort positions," and military working dogs.  The SMU Task Force Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003 stated that he was sure [delete] [delete] saw the policy, that he asked him to sign it, and that a copy of the policy sat in the Commander's inbox during the Legal Advisor's deployment to the Task Force. 
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Task Force's Legal Advisor who arrived at the TF facility in late August 2003 likewise said that his predecessor had tried, without success, to get [delete] [delete] to sign the policy.  That same Legal Advisor stated that he too tried numerous times, also unsuccessfully, to get the Commander to sign the policy. The Legal Advisor added that it got to the point where he would print out a fresh copy of the policy every night and give it to [delete] aide. The Legal Advisor said that he knew the Commander had received copies of the policy from his aide, but that he had a habit of repeatedly "losing" the draft policy.  He said that the exercise became "laughable" and eventually, he was forced to raise the issue with the [delete] legal Advisor.  In the absence of [delete] [delete] guidance, the Legal Advisor told the Committee that his direction to SMU personnel was that the unsigned SOP applied to SMU TF interrogations.
[Delete] [delete] The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches was posted on a wall at the SMU TF facility.  He specifically recalled stress positions, loud music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogations. He stated that, although military working dogs were not typically present at the SMU TF facility, he recalled making a phone call to arrange for a military working dog to be present for an interrogation.
[Delete] [delete] While neither the January 10, 2003 nor the July 15, 2003 SMU policies included "removal of clothing" there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at the SMU TF. [Big delete] who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003, stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee."  [Delete] stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was uncomfortable with stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique."  [Delete] said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. 
[Delete] However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU TF from December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by [delete] [delete] in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of interrogations.  The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that the technique was 'widespread" at that time.  He said that he advised the Commander that, if stripping were to be authorized, it should be limited to males only and that naked detainees should not be paraded through the Task Force facility. The Legal Advisor stated that two SMU TF behavioral scientists who also attended the meeting advised [delete] not to permit interrogators to strip detainees because of the implications of nudity in Arab culture. The Legal Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would continue to use nudity as an interrogation technique though the Legal Advisor stated that he thought [delete] may have said that he [delete] have to approve its use.
[Delete] Both LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), and COL Thomas Pappas, the Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205th MI BDE) in Iraq told the Committee that they were unaware of what interrogation techniques were authorized for use at the SMU TF facility.  Interrogators from the 205th MI BDE, however, served at the SMU TF in support of interrogation operations there. In mid-June 2003, at the request of the SMU TF, CJTF-7 assigned two Arabic-speaking interrogators to the SMU.  COL Pappas recalled sending a second set of approximately two to four interrogators from the 205th MI BDE to the SMU TF around November 2003 to replace the 205th MI BDE personnel already serving at the SMU. 
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 would have retained UCMJ authority over the interrogators and the interrogators would have been required to conduct interrogations under the CJTF-7 authorities rather than those at the SMU TF.  COL Pappas, however, believed that once his interrogators were sent to the SMU TF, that they were bound by the rules of the SMU TF and not CJTF-7 interrogation guidance. 
(U) The Iraq Survey Group was established in June 2003. According to its first Commander MG Keith Dayton, the ISG's mission was to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of WMD and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor on WMD.  MG Dayton reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid. As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG debriefed and interrogated high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of those detainees had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF and other operational units before being handed over to the ISG. From the onset, ISG personnel had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of detainees.
(U) MG Dayton told the DoD Inspector General that "as our interrogators started getting into the swing of things at Camp Cropper... some of the prisoners were alleging that they had been roughed up" by the SMU TF.  MG Dayton stated that his Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) Chief [delete] had described the situation as "a disaster waiting to happen" and believed that ISG needed to "slam some rules on this place right away to basically keep ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated properly." 
(U) [Delete] said that he first became aware of allegations of detainee mistreatment while at the ISG facilities in the first week in June 2003.  At that time, a Chief Warrant Officer told him that a detainee she was interrogating had alleged physical abuse during his capture and subsequent interrogation by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that "by mid-June 2003. a pattern of reports of abuse of prisoners (abuse primarily attributed to [the SMU TF] during their capture and interrogation of [high value targets] and other detainees, was coming to me..." 
[Delete] MG Dayton described what he called a "notorious case" of alleged detainee abuse, in which a badly burned detainee was brought to the ISG facility.  MG Dayton stated that according to the "special forces guys," the detainee had been captured on a very hot day, was thrown down on the metal floor on the Humvee, and during the long drive back from the operation, the detainee had "burned himself lying on the floor of the Humvee." 
(U) Throughout the summer and autumn of 2003, ISG personnel continued to be concerned about the treatment of detainees by SMU TF personnel. [Delete] stated that, during the last week in June 2003, a British interrogator reported to him that a detainee who had been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF "was beaten so severely, that he had the MPs at Camp Cropper note the [detainee's] condition."  [Delete] said he was told that the detainee's "back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black eyes, plus multiple contusions on his face." 
[Delete] According to the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and August 2003, during one of the nightly briefings held at the SMU TF Joint Operations Center, [delete] the SMU TF Commander, said "continue to work him over" and "work him hard" in reference to a particular detainee being interrogated at the SMUTF.  The Legal Advisor said that about 50 people were present when [delete] made that statement, that he (the Legal Advisor) was concerned about the message it conveyed, and that he subsequently spoke to the Commander about it. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] made a similar statement on a video teleconference,
[Delete] MG Dayton recalled that [delete] sought to address reports of SMU TF detainee mistreatment with him. According to MG Dayton, [delete] heard that "rumors" of detainee mistreatment were circulating and "he wanted to set [MG Dayton's] mind at rest."  MG Dayton recalled that he spoke to [delete] a few times and that [delete] [delete] told him "You're going to hear rumors, but it's all -- it's all untrue." 
(U) In addition to allegations of mistreatment by the SMU TF, [delete] the JIDC Chief said that he was informed in early June that the ICRC had visited a facility run by the 323 MI Battalion where high value detainees were undergoing interrogations.  [Delete] said that the ICRC had subsequently prepared an inspection report [delete]. (He said that he understood the abuse had allegedly taken place while the detainees were under the control of the 115th MP Battalion.) [Delete] said he was told [delete]:
1. CJTF-7 Stands Up (Summer 2003) (U) (U) In May 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) began preparations to take over from CFLCC as the operational headquarters for all conventional ground units in the Iraqi theater. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, stated that during summer 2003, the general belief was that the number of forces in Iraq had to shrink as quickly as possible and that, accordingly, CENTCOM and CFLCC reduced troop levels "very, very rapidly."  LTG Sanchez said that the drawdown left insufficient personnel behind for CJTF-7 to fulfill its mission as well as inadequate command structures, planning capacities, and intelligence capabilities. He said that during the handover "there were no intelligence structures that were transferred to [CJTF-7] from CFLCC" and, as a result, the remaining intelligence structure did not enable CJTF-7 to address the requirements of a Combined Joint Task Force operating at a "strategic, operational, and tactical level." 
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that by July 2003, it was evident "that CJTF-7 was engaged in a counterinsurgency operation that would be difficult if not impossible to win without significant improvements in the intelligence capabilities of [CJTF-7]."  LTG Sanchez said that he was particularly concerned about his HUMINT capabilities, including the level of interrogation expertise within CJTF-7, and that he "seriously questioned the training and experience of our interrogators." 
(U) LTG Sanchez said he posed a challenge to his staff: "How do we ensure that we have the right mechanisms in place that allow our interrogators to push the limit of our authorities yet prevent a violation of the Geneva Convention and our duty to treat detainees humanely?"  He said that "references to the [Field Manuals] and doctrine were common responses but the issues being faced were beyond the scope of the Army's limited doctrine."  LTG Sanchez added that there was frustration about the ability to get a handle on the insurgency and that he put a tremendous amount of pressure on his intelligence officers. 
(U) The Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Pappas, said that soon after arriving in theater in July 2003, CJTF-7's Chief of Staff BG Daniel Hahn directed him to attend a meeting to brief LTG Sanchez on interrogation operations.  COL Pappas told the Committee that he learned at that meeting that LTG Sanchez was concerned that interrogations had not generated the expected intelligence information.  COL Pappas said that LTG Sanchez "believed that if the brigade improved its interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, that we would get the information necessary to stop the insurgency."  COL Pappas agreed and told LTG Sanchez that his interrogators would need the authority to use additional interrogation techniques to accomplish that goal. 
(U) In mid-Summer 2003, the 205th MI BDE began preparing for Operation Victory Bounty, an undertaking designed to track down remaining elements of the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary organization loyal to Saddam Hussein.  In late July 2003, ten to twelve members of the 519th MI Battalion went to Abu Ghraib to establish interrogation operations in anticipation of receiving individuals captured during Victory Bounty.  On August 4, 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the 519th MI Battalion Assistant Operations Officer, assumed duties as the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at the facility.  In late 2002, she had served as the Interrogation Operations Officer at the Bagram detention facility in Afghanistan.
(U) According to CPT Wood, no SOP was in place for interrogations when she took command, but interrogations were conducted "within the approved approaches within the Field Manual 34-52 only, with the possible addition of stress positions."  CPT Wood stated that interrogators had used sleep deprivation and stress positions in Afghanistan and that she "perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as Afghanistan."  She said that she used her "best judgment and concluded [the techniques] would be effective tools for interrogations at [Abu Ghraib]."  She also said that she later put together a request for additional interrogation options because "the winds of war were changing" and there was "mounting pressure from higher for 'actionable intelligence' from interrogation operations."  CPT Wood said that she did not want to repeat her experience in Afghanistan, where interrogators lacked written guidance. 
(U) CPT Wood said that guidance for interrogators about the rules for interrogations was important because the interrogators in the 519th Battalion had come to Abu Ghraib with a range of different experiences:
A lot of the interrogators and analysts also served in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan where some other techniques were approved for use ... I understood the Afghanistan rules were a little different because the detainees were not classified as EPWs. It was, ''use techniques in the spirit of the Geneva convention," not, ''you will apply the Geneva Convention." In order to use those similar techniques from GTMO and Afghanistan in Iraq, we sought approval from the higher command. 
(U) COL Pappas, CPT Wood's superior officer, said he knew that CPT Wood believed she needed additional techniques and told her to submit a request. 
(U) On July 26, 2003, CPT Wood submitted a proposed interrogation policy to her chain of command. The proposed policy was based on the interrogation policy in use at the SMU TF facility in Iraq.  CPT Wood said that she and her staff simply "cleaned up some of the grammar, changed the heading and signature block, and sent it up" to CJTF-7 as a proposed policy for the 519th MI BDE. 
[Delete] Mirroring the SMU TF policies, CPT Wood's proposed policy included sleep management, ''vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone), presence of military working dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control.  The proposed policy stated that "EPWs that refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."  The prohibition against threats, insults and exposure to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment, however, was limited to EPWs and CPT Wood stated that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. 
(U) CPT Wood stated that submitting the proposed interrogation policy seemed a "natural progression" to her as she understood the techniques were already approved for use at the SMU TF in Iraq, and the policy was "similar to that of a document that was drafted in Afghanistan for the [Bagram Collection Point] as well as ... GTMO."  CPT Wood did not hear back from CJTF-7 at that time.  Just a few weeks later CJTF-7 itself solicited a "wish list" of interrogation techniques.
(U) On August 14, 2003, CPT William Ponce, the Battle Captain in the CJTF-7 HUMINT and Counterintelligence office (CJ2X), sent out an email to subordinate intelligence elements (including the 205th MI BDE and the 519th MI BN) requesting that they submit their "interrogation techniques wish list[s]."  CPT Ponce wrote:
Immediately seek input from interrogation elements (Division / Corps) concerning what their special interrogation knowledge base is and more importantly, what techniques would they feel would be effective techniques that SJA could review (basically provide a list). 
CPT Ponce added:
...The gloves are coming off gentleman regarding these detainees. Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks. 
(U) The Commander of the 205th MI BDE, COL Pappas, said he thought that CPT Ponce's email soliciting "interrogation techniques wish lists" was the result of the meeting he attended with LTG Sanchez shortly after arriving in theater.  He called the Battle Captain's use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off" a "dumb" thing to say and a "poor choice of words."  LTG Sanchez told the Committee that he expected his intelligence staff to send out the request for interrogation techniques, but stated that the use of the phrase ''the gloves are coming off' was "not good."  LTG Sanchez believed that the email reflected frustration on the part of intelligence personnel at not being able to meet his intelligence requirements.
(U) Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Lewis Welshofer, who was with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment responded to CPT Ponce's email with his own assessment of the interrogation situation:
Today's enemy, particularly those in [Southwest Asia], understand force, not psychological mind games or incentives. I would propose a baseline interrogation technique that at a minimum allows for physical contact resembling that used by SERE schools (This allows open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection from a distance of about 18 inches. Again, this is open handed.) ...Other techniques would include close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litany of harsher fear-up approaches. . . fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off. 
(U) Maj. Nathan Hoepner, the Operations Officer (S-3) of the 501st MI Battalion took issue with the language in CPT Ponce email, stating in an email of his own:
As for "the gloves need to come off..." we need to take a deep breath and remember who we are. Those gloves are most definitely NOT based on Cold War or WWII enemies -- they are based on clearly established standards of international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators. Those in turn derive from practices commonly accepted as morally correct, the so-called "usages of war." It comes down to standards of right and wrong -- something we cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient, any more than we can declare that we will "take no prisoners" and therefore shoot those who surrender to us simply because we find prisoners inconvenient.
"The casualties are mounting..." we have taken casualties in every war we have ever fought -- that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties, generally more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such things to us. Casualties are part of war -- if you cannot take casualties then you cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there. 
(U) On August 27, 2003, CPT Wood re-submitted the proposed interrogation policy that she had previously sent in July. She said she thought the issue came up because CJTF-7 headquarters "want[ed] these guys broken" and said her August submission may have been a response to CPT Ponce's email. 
[Delete] Though largely the same as the proposed policy submitted on July 26, 2003, the August 27, 2003 proposed policy included one additional interrogation technique - "sensory deprivation," which the proposed policy described as a "combination use of isolation and sleep management [big delete]."  The proposed interrogation policy also inserted the term "stress positions" in place of "vary comfort positions" and limited use of sleep deprivation to 72 hours. 
(U) CPT Wood said that two days after she submitted the proposed policy, two lawyers from CJTF-7 visited Abu Ghraib with a copy of her memo.  According to CPT Wood, the two attorneys said that "they did not see anything wrong with it and that they would add their approval and forward it higher to CJTF-7 for consideration and review." 
(U) Techniques in CPT Wood's proposed policy can be traced back though the SMU TF in Iraq to Afghanistan and, ultimately, to techniques authorized for use at GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002. The GTMO techniques were, in turn, influenced by techniques used by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the military service SERE schools to train U.S. personnel to resist illegal enemy interrogations. In the summer of 2003, as CPT Wood was seeking approval for her proposed policy, the SMU TF in Iraq was soliciting JPRA's advice on interrogations.
[Delete] In the summer of 2003 the Commander of the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq, [delete] called the Commander of JPRA, Col Randy Moulton, to request assistance with Task Force interrogations. 
[Delete] On August 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA "interrogation team."  The request asked that JPRA send two or more individuals to the TF for three weeks to "provide assistance to current interrogation efforts of key [high value targets]."  On August 27, 2003, [big delete] request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to support the request.  That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF.
[Delete] Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operations Support Office (OSO) subsequently selected three JPRA personnel for the mission. As Team Chief, Mr. Wirts chose Lt Col Steven Kleinman, a reserve officer who happened to be a trained interrogator. Mr. Wirts also chose Terrence Russell, JPRA's manager for research and development who was also a SERE specialist. Though Mr. Russell had no formal interrogation training or experience, he had previously conducted interrogation-related training for [delete] JTF-GTMO personnel. To complete the team, Mr. Wirts chose Lenny Miller, a contract SERE instructor who also lacked interrogation experience but who the SMU TF had specifically requested. The team's deployment date was set for September 1, 2003. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that, before being deployed, he thought he was being sent to Iraq to identify problems in the TF interrogation program.  More than a year earlier, Lt Col Kleinman had drafted a paper identifying challenges faced by interrogators at GTMO.  In the draft paper, Lt Col Kleinman identified "fundamental systemic problems" at GTMO that undermined operational effectiveness. 
[Delete] Chief among the problems identified in the draft paper was the lack of trained personnel with experience in strategic interrogations.  Lt Col Kleinman recommended a number of options in his draft paper to enhance DoD's ability to conduct strategic interrogation, including additional training.  He recommended having experienced "survival, intelligence, and human factors specialists" conduct an "in-depth assessment" of operations at GTMO and provide a "comprehensive report that would set forth concrete steps to improve operational effectiveness and security."  Lt Col Kleinman's paper did not recommend teaching interrogators at GTMO how to use SERE techniques in interrogations and he said that he did not believe that was the purpose of the Iraq trip. 
[Delete] JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF request.  JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton told the Committee that he was pretty sure he also conducted a briefing for the JFCOM Director for Operations (J-3) about JPRA's support to interrogation efforts at the SMU TF, although he could not recall when that briefing occurred.  The JFCOM J-3, BG Thomas Moore, who was involved in coordinating at least one of JPRA's previous "offensive" training sessions completed his assignment as the J-3 at JFCOM in early to mid-August and was replaced by RADM John Bird. 
(U) On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in Iraq, Col Moulton emailed a JPRA "Weekly Report" to the JFCOM Command Group and others stating:
We deployed a Personnel Recovery Support Team to Baghdad in support of CENTCOM and [redacted] interrogation requirements. This is an issue that may merit Lessons Learned visibility, as there is currently no focal point within DoD for strategic debriefing / interrogation [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development (offensive). Currently, subject matter expertise on captivity environments, psychology, and maintenance resides almost solely within JPRA (defensive). 
(U) In response, the JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Robert Wagner, questioned whether JPRA was operating within its charter. He wrote: "I'm not sure I see the connection between your assigned responsibilities and this task ... [W]hat charter places JPRA in the business of intelligence collection?"  Col Moulton responded "There is nothing in our charter or elsewhere that points us towards the offensive side of captivity conduct nor are we requesting to take this on as a new responsibility."  He added, however, that JPRA had a role to play in helping to educate and assist offensive operations, stating:
[Those conducting interrogations] have already demonstrated the need for our understanding and knowledge of captivity environment and psychology. We are also well aware of the problems associated with crossing the Rubicon into intel collection (or anything close). There may be a compromise position (my gut choice) whereby we could provide/assist in oversight, training, analysis, research, and [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development, while leaving the actual debriefing/interrogation to those already assigned the responsibility. 
(U) In a subsequent email to RADM Bird, Col Moulton stated that while he was concerned about "mission creep" and departing too far from JPRA's traditional role, it was his view that "no DoD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic debriefing/interrogation."  Col Moulton wrote:
Our subject matter experts (and certain Service SERE psychologist[s]) currently have the most knowledge and depth within DoD on the captivity environment and exploitation. I think that JPRA/JFCOM needs to keep involved for reasons of TTP development and information sharing. We are NOT looking to expand our involvement to active participation. The current support was intended to be limited to advice, assistance, and observation. Our potential participation is predicated solely on the request of the Combatant Commander. 
(U) Col Moulton testified to the Committee that before he sent the JPRA team to Iraq he talked to the SMU Task Force commander and was told that SMU TF detainees "were detained unlawful combatants and not covered under the Geneva Conventions."  Col Moulton later said, referring to a subsequent call with the SMU TF Commander, that he did not know if the SMU TF Commander had "specifically" told him that. 
[Delete] On September 5, 2003, after their arrival in Iraq, the three-member JPRA team met with SMU TF personnel at the TF facility.  According to U Col Kleinman, the JPRA Team Chief, the team was told that interrogators were having trouble gaining actionable intelligence information from detainees in TF custody.  Lt Col Kleinman felt that the SMU TF's lack of success was a result of a poor screening process, which resulted in the TF holding some detainees with no information. 
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, the team also met that day with the SMU TF Commander [delete] and discussed [delete] expectations for the JPRA team.  Mr. Russell said that [delete] "expected [the JPRA team] to become fully engaged in interrogation operations" and "encouraged [the team] to receive modified" rules of engagement (ROEs) from JPRA, since their ROEs at that time permitted the team to "advise and assist" but not to "engage in direct interrogations." 
[Delete] Over the next week, Lt Col Kleinman spoke by phone with Col Moulton at least twice. While accounts by the three JPRA team members of those calls differed in some respects, all agree that the calls resulted in Col Moulton (1) authorizing the team to participate in SMU Task Force interrogations and (2) authorizing the team to use the full range of SERE school physical pressures in those interrogations. Col Moulton confirmed that the team's understanding of his guidance was correct. 
[Delete] According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton on September 5, 2003 to discuss the team's ROEs and, the following day, Col Moulton gave the team permission to "become fully engaged in all BIF operations."  That account is consistent with Col Moulton's recollection, which was that Lt Col Kleinman called him after arriving in Iraq to discuss a request from the SMU TF that team members actually participate in interrogations. 
[Delete] Col Moulton said that, after getting the call from Lt Col Kleinman, he called [delete] [delete] "to confirm and inquire about the new request."  In subsequent interviews and communications, Col Moulton has consistently stated that he relayed [delete] request to JFCOM and got JFCOM's authorization to permit the JPRA team to participate in interrogations. Col Moulton's recollection of who at JFCOM provided that authority, however, has varied.
(U) According to a memorandum of a September 2005 interview with the JPRA Commander, Col Moulton "relayed the request to the [JFCOM] J3 and got the verbal OK to allow active participation, but only for one or two demonstrations and then the team was to go back to its role as observers." 
(U) In a 2006 email to the DoD IG, however, Col Moulton could not recall exactly whom at JFCOM he had spoken with, stating:
During the deployment I received a call from the Task Force commander requesting that our personnel participate in the debriefing. I notified JFCOM leadership of the request (either BG Moore or LTG Wagner I can't remember, but think it was [LTG] Wagner since this was late on a weekend night) and was told that they could support, but that any activities had to be approved through the task forces legal rep (we were chopped to them). 
[Delete] In interviews with Committee staff in 2007, Col Moulton said that he had tried but had been unable to reach BGen Moore, so instead he called LTG Wagner whom he reached at home.  According to that account, LTG Wagner told Col Moulton that he needed approval from his boss, JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, to approve the JPRA request.  According to Col Moulton, LTG Wagner called him back and gave his approval. 
[Delete] BGen Moore, whom Col Moulton referenced in his September 2005 interview, was no longer assigned to JFCOM in September 2003.  RADM Bird, who replaced BGen Moore, stated that he did not recall receiving a call from the JPRA Commander. RADM Bird said that he thought it unlikely he would have received the call on the weekend as it would have had to have occurred over a secure line and he did not have that capability at home. LTG Wagner told the Committee that he could not recall if he received a call from Col Moulton. 
[Delete] According to Terrence Russell, one of the JPRA team in Iraq, the JPRA team received permission from Col Moulton "to become fully engaged in all BIF operations."  The next day, team members met with the SMU TF staff and "outlined the exploitation cycle and how [the staff] could incorporate [SERE Training, Tactics, and Procedures] to support their current interrogation operations." 
[Delete] While it is not known when it occurred, the Chief of Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence (J-2X) for the SMU stated that members of the JPRA team demonstrated interrogation techniques, including the "attention slap," which he said was described as an openhanded slap to focus the detainee on the interrogation, and walling, which was described as a push up against the wall.  The J-2X could not recall if all members of the JPRA team were present during that lesson.  Lt Col Kleinman said that he was not aware of such a lesson. 
[Delete] The J-2X stated that he was unsure if techniques taught to the staff were permitted under SMU TF policy and that, after the JPRA demonstration, he raised this matter with the SMU TF J2, which at the time was [delete]. 
[Delete] On September 6, 2003, JPRA team members were present in the interrogation booth when a SMU TF interrogator used "selected physical pressures" on a detainee.  According to Terrence Russell, the SMU TF interrogator "put the detainee on his knees and later began to use insult slaps every 3-4 seconds for an extended period of time." 
(U) Lt Col (now Colonel) Kleinman described that same interrogation in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Lt Col Kleinman said:
I walked into the interrogation room, all painted in black with [a] spotlight on the detainee. Behind the detainee was a military guard... with a[n] iron bar... slapping it in his hand. The interrogator was sitting in a chair. The interpreter was - was to his left... and the detainee was on his knees... A question was asked by the interrogator, interpreted, the response came back and, upon interpretation, the detainee would be slapped across the face... And that continued with every question and every response. I asked my colleagues how long this had been going on, specifically the slapping, they said approximately 30 minutes. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that his two JPRA colleagues, who were present during the interrogation, "didn't seem to think there [was] a problem, because in SERE training... there's a facial slap, but it's conducted in very specific ways... This was not conducted in that fashion."  In fact, Lt Col Kleinman described the environment at the Task Force facility as ''uncontrolled." 
[Delete] Members of the JPRA team had differing views on the appropriate response to the interrogator's use of those techniques. Mr. Russell stated that he and Mr. Miller "saw nothing wrong with" the interrogator forcing the detainee to kneel or his slapping the detainee during the interrogation.  Lt Col Kleinman had a different reaction.
[Delete] Lt Col Kleinman considered forcing the detainee to kneel and repeatedly slapping him to be "direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and [actions that] could constitute a war crime."  Upon witnessing the abusive conduct, Lt Col Kleinman sought out the SMU TF J- 2X.  Lt Col Kleinman told the J-2X what he had witnessed and recommended ''that the session be halted immediately."  Lt Col Kleinman said the J-2X told him "[y]our judgment is my judgment. Do what you think. is right." 
[Delete] Following his conversation with the J-2X, Lt Col Kleinman asked the two members of his team to step out of the interrogation booth. According to Mr. Russell:
In the hallway [Lt Col] Kleinman asked us our impression of the use of the kneeling and slaps. We both indicated that we saw nothing wrong with what was going on. He asked us our opinion of the slapping and we said they were only insult slaps and were not inflicting any pain to the detainee. [Lt Col] Kleinman indicated his disagreement and that both the slaps and kneeling were direct violations of the Geneva Conventions and could constitute a war crime. He further indicated that he wanted to intervene and stop the interrogation at that point. 
[Delete] Over the objections of the other two members of JPRA team. Lt Col Kleinman then asked the SMU TF interrogator to step out of the booth. He explained to the interrogator "how and why [the interrogator's] methods were a violation of the Geneva Convention and TF [Policy]."  According to Lt Col Kleinman, "[the interrogator] accepted my direction without reservation." 
[Delete] With respect to Lt Col Kleinman's actions, Mr. Russell stated:
I think the clear violation of the TF policy was of a minor nature - that being a 10-minute extension of the kneeling policy. The use of insult slaps was, in the opinion of [Lt Col] Kleinman, serious enough to stop the interrogation - an action I did not then or now feel warranted his direct intervention. 
[Delete] In subsequent testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell claimed that the use of the "insult slap" was consistent with the facility's operating instructions:
Under their operating instructions at that BIF, at that time and place, we did not see anything wrong with [the use of physical pressures]. It may not have been applied the way we would have done it, but we didn't see anything wrong with it. We advised [Lt Col] Kleinman of the same. He disagreed with us. 
[Delete] SMU TF SOPs reviewed by the Committee do not include slapping as an authorized technique and the SMU TF J-2X told the Committee that he was unaware of any operating instructions that would have permitted an interrogator to repeatedly slap a detainee. 
[Delete] Despite Mr. Russell's previous statement that he "saw nothing wrong with what was going on," he testified to the Committee that he found the SMU TF interrogator's repeated use of the insult slap to be "odd" and "in excess" of what would be used in resistance training at JPRA  Mr. Russell also testified that the technique, as applied by the TF interrogator, was ineffective:
[The] insult slap is just that, it's an insult. After you do it two or three times it loses its effectiveness because the [sic], in our world, the student is anticipating the slap. It loses its effectiveness if you do it more than two or three or four times. 
[Delete] While he did not raise any objection to their use in the interrogation, Mr. Russell stated that the techniques used at the SERE school, such as the insult slap, were not designed to elicit information from individuals but rather to "guide the student" to an appropriate resistance posture.  According to his testimony, "history has shown us that physical pressures are not effective for compelling an individual to give information or to do something" and are not useful in gaining accurate, actionable intelligence.  There is no indication in Mr. Russell's trip report, however, that he told anyone on the J-2X staff that the SMU TF's use of repeated slaps would be ineffective or that use of other SERE physical pressures, such as ''walling'', which were reportedly described for the J-2X staff, would be ineffective.
[Delete] Mr. Russell stated that when physical pressures are applied in the resistance phase of SERE training, medical and psychological personnel are present to observe interrogations and protect SERE school students,  Mr. Russell testified that there were no medical or psychological personnel present during the interrogations he witnessed while at the SMU TF facility. 
(U) At some point shortly after he intervened to stop the interrogation where the detainee was placed on his knees and slapped, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton.  Lt Col Kleinman testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team was "being asked to use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees."  Lt Col Kleinman testified that he also told Col Moulton that he had intervened to stop interrogations at the Task Force and that the use of SERE techniques "were violations of the Geneva Convention, they weren't authorized, and we should not do them." 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he also told the SMU TF Commander that the use of SERE techniques in interrogations was ''unlawful'' and "a violation of the Geneva Convention."  He said that the SMU TF Commander agreed with him but there were "no orders ever issued" by the Commander not to use the techniques. 
[Delete] [delete] According to Lt Col Kleinman's trip report, after he spoke with Col Moulton, Col Moulton subsequently spoke to the SMU TF Commander, and then called him back to tell him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot" to use ''the full range of JPRA methods" on detainees, specifically including "walling, sleep deprivation, isolation, physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach slaps, and finger pokes to the chest), space/time disorientation, [and] white noise." 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that Col Moulton told him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot to use SERE methods" in interrogations.  Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Col Moulton that he considered this instruction to be an illegal order and that he would not carry it out. Col Moulton said that Lt Col Kleinman "was adamant about that he thought it was against the Geneva Convention." 
[Delete] Following his conversation with the JPRA Commander, Lt Col Kleinman consulted with the SMU TF lawyer who advised him that the SERE tactics "fell outside the parameters of acceptability under the [Geneva Conventions] and [Task Force] policy."  Lt Col Kleinman then met with the other two members of the JPRA team to inform them of the JPRA Commander's order that they could use ''the normal and usual range of physical pressures" during interrogations and to alert them of his concerns about the legality of that order.  Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report:
[Lt Col] Kleinman indicated that he felt [it was] '... an illegal order' and we were exposing ourselves to possible future difficulties if we used any pressure inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that he relayed his conversation with Col Moulton to his two JPRA colleagues, informing them that he told Col Moulton that the authority to use SERE techniques "was an unlawful order" and that he "wasn't going to have any involvement with it, and [he] didn't think that they should either." 
[Delete] Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, the JPRA contractor, disagreed with Lt Col Kleinman's assessment.  According to Mr. Russell, the two "indicated that the use of these moderate physical pressures, when used appropriately, were consistent with proper handling and interrogation."  In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell added that he understood that the individuals held by the Task Force were considered "detained unlawful combatants" and "not automatically provided the protections of the Geneva Conventions," though he could not recall who told him this. 
[Delete] [delete] Shortly after Col Moulton told Lt Col Kleinman that the team was "cleared hot" to employ the full range of JPRA methods, Lt Col Kleinman recommended that the TF Legal Advisor arrange a formal briefing with the SMU TF interrogation staff and the JPRA team  In that meeting, Lt Col Kleinman reported that the TF Legal Advisor "set forth legal limitations that essentially excluded most of the [JPRA methods] (with the use of certain stress positions, such as kneeling on a hard floor for up to 30 minutes, cited as an acceptable method)." 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that although the SMU TF lawyer agreed with him that it was unlawful to use SERE techniques in interrogations, when the lawyer later briefed interrogators on the techniques, there was no longer "any clarity" about whether or not they were illegal. 
[Delete] Mr. Russell also described the TF Legal Advisor's briefing in his trip report:
The [TF Legal Advisor] discussed the [TF Commander's] expectations versus the methods of exploitation and physical pressures he had heard were being used in the BIF - including those prior to his recent arrival (2-3 weeks on site). He also discussed the status of the detainees and the fact that the BIF's detainees were not identified to the ICRC. He discussed the assumption of risk being taken by the [SMU]. command if BIF personnel engaged in 'beat down' tactics or while 'engaging in torture.' 
[Delete] The TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that the SMU TF did not make status determinations for detainees, but that he advised in his briefing that the protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to those detainees under the control of the SMU TF. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that after he told his two JPRA colleagues that Col Moulton had "cleared hot" their use of SERE techniques in interrogations, his colleagues decided to "demonstrate the way you handle an interrogation." 
[Delete] [delete] Around the time that Lt Col Kleinman met with the SMU TF Legal Advisor, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller met separately with the SMU TF Director of Intelligence (J-2), COL Brian Keller, and his J-2X and participated in interrogations with J-2X staff.  In one instance, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took the lead in the interrogation of a detainee.  The interrogation began with the simulated release of the detainee - the detainee was permitted to clean up, leave the facility, and was escorted to a bus stop, when he was "captured" again.  When the detainee was brought back to the SMU TF facility, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took physical control of the detainee and led him into a holding cell.  Once in the holding cell, one or both of the men forcibly stripped the detainee naked.  [Big delete]."  He told the Committee: "we [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students." 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also described that interrogation in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said the detainee was driven away from the Task Force's interrogation facility to make him think he was being released and then brought back to a "bunker that was about a story ... into the ground - cement, cold, dark."  He said:
[The detainee] was literally carried by two of the guards into the bunker struggling against them. He was taken down there. My two JPRA colleagues took over from that point. .. [T]hey ripped his Abaya off - not cut - they ripped it off... ripped off his underwear, took his shoes, they'd hooded him already, then they - they had shackled him by the wrist and ankles - being screamed at the entire time in his ear in English about essentially... what a poor specimen of human that he was... And then the orders were given that he was to stand in that position for 12 hours no matter how much he asked for help, no matter how much he pleaded, unless he passed out, the guards were not to respond to any requests for help. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he told his colleagues that what they did was ''unlawful'' and he stopped the interrogation. 
[Delete] Mr. Russell testified to the Committee that the detainee was naked only for "however long it took to have his clothes taken off and put the new dish-dash on again." 
[Delete] In his trip report, Lt Col Kleinman reported that he told the two other JPRA team members that he disagreed with their approach.  Mr. Russell stated that the exploitation scenario was conducted after coordination with the J- 2X staff and that the techniques, including isolation and sleep deprivation, were "employed in accordance with existing TF guidance and policy."  While Col Kleinman testified that he intervened to stop the interrogation, Mr. Russell said that Lt Col Kleinman never raised an objection to the interrogation. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that he intervened to stop another interrogation being conducted by SMU TF personnel.  Lt Col Kleinman said that "a plan was laid out on butcher paper for another detainee that involved extensive stress positions, followed by interrogation, followed by short periods of sleep."  Lt Col Kleinman photographed the plan which had been posted in plain view and described a schedule for keeping the detainee awake and placing him in stress positions.  The plan listed the following schedule:
*1830 -2130 Awake
(U) Another photograph showed the same detainee in his cell and hooded. His hands appear handcuffed behind his back.  Lt Col Kleinman said that his photograph did not reflect the fact that the detainee also had his ankles shackled. 
[Delete] [delete] Mr. Russell's trip report appears to confirm Lt Col Kleinman's account. It stated that Lt Col Kleinman intervened in an SMU TF "interrogator's plan for imposing a regime of sleep deprivation and physical pressures."  According to Mr. Russell, the proposed interrogation regimen "included an 18-hour plan to impose sleep deprivation and physical activities [big delete]" as well as "the use of two separate 30-minute kneeling sessions separated by 3 hours of standing or resting."  According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman reportedly objected to the use of "kneeling."  Mr. Russell said that he and Mr. Miller felt that "the regime proposal was appropriate and well within [the SMU TF] current [Rules of Engagement] for detainee handling." 
[Delete] While the team was in Iraq, [delete] requested that JPRA develop a formal Concept of Operations (CONOP) for detainee exploitation.  Col Moulton tasked members of the team with developing the CONOP.  Mr. Russell's trip report stated that he drafted the CONOP in Iraq and that Mr. Miller and Lt Col Kleinman reviewed it and offered suggestions.  He later testified to the Committee that he drafted a "skeleton of a CONOP" with Mr. Miller and that Lt Col Kleinman was aware that they were working on it.  Lt Col Kleinman said that he knew that his team members were working on a CONOP, but that he did not see sections of it. 
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Mr. Russell that he would not participate in drafting the CONOP because he "absolutely disagreed with that type of expansion of the use of SERE methods," and that his "contribution would be nothing but contrary." 
[Delete] While the JPRA team was still in Iraq, the draft was shared with and edited by JPRA personnel in the U.S., including Christopher Wirts, JPRA's Operations Support Office Chief.  The CONOP, called "Concept of Operations for HVT exploitation," provided JPRA's "recommendations and guidance to USG forces conducting exploitation operations. 
[Delete] The September 2003 CONOP was similar to the April 2002 "Exploitation Draft Plan" that Dr. Bruce Jessen, JPRA's former senior SERE psychologist, had drafted shortly before JPRA's support to [delete] the DoD General Counsel.  As had the April 2002 exploitation draft plan, the CONOP described a JPRA-directed exploitation process and included recommendations for exploitation and captivity operations, such as "tailoring detainee punishment consequences to maximize cultural undesirability." 
[Delete] The September 2003 CONOP also identified "critical operational exploitation principles," including:
[Big delete]  Controlling authority sets [Rules of Engagement] prior to initiating process within the Torture Convention [11.] Established the latitude and process for the HVT team to offer concessions for validated information or cooperation of the HVT, [big delete].
[Delete] Those exploitation principles were similar to those that had been included in the exploitation draft plan nearly a year and a half earlier. In addition, the September 2003 JPRA CONOP listed specific interrogation techniques and incorporated portions of the March 6, 2003 DoD Interrogation Working Group draft report. JPRA personnel considered the Working Group report authoritative guidance on U.S. policy and law. 
[Big delete].  Mr. Wirts said that the DoD Working Group draft reflected material that the Working Group had gleaned from JPRA on SERE training and that it was, in turn, used to formulate the HVT exploitation CONOP.  A copy of a CONOP that incorporated interrogation techniques from the Working Group draft was circulated while the team was still in Iraq, and was sent to CAPT Daniel Donovan, the JFCOM Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), on September 23, 2003. 
(U) According to the DoD Inspector General's August 2006 report, when it "became apparent that friction was developing" between the SMU TF and the JPRA team, ''the decision was made to pull the team out [of Iraq] before more damage was done to the relationship between the two organizations."  Lt Col Kleinman referred to the DoD IG report's statement that "friction was developing" as an understatement and said that he felt his life was being threatened at the SMU TF.  He recalled one instance (after he stopped what he believed to be in violation of the Geneva Conventions) in which an SMU TF member told him, while sharpening a knife, to "sleep lightly," noting that they did not "coddl[e] terrorists" at the SMU TF. 
[Delete] The SMU TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that JPRA had no business at the SMU TF facility either assisting in or conducing interrogations and that he sought to have the team removed  The Legal Advisor said that he met with [delete] the SMU TF Commander, and told him that SERE training was not meant for detainees and that JPRA's presence had the potential to lead to abuse. He also recalled telling the Commander that JPRA was not qualified or trained to perform interrogations. The Legal Advisor said that [delete] [delete] did not act on his concerns.
[Delete] Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report that the SMU TF Operations Officer (J-3) also recommended to [delete] that the JPRA team should leave the facility, noting that the J-3 ''was particularly concerned over the [JPRA] CONOP having been sent [to JPRA headquarters] without his staff's security review."  On September 22, 2003, the JPRA Commander directed Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Miller to return to the U.S., but told Mr. Russell to remain in place for ''the possible arrival of a follow-up team."  On September 23, 2003, the team's original scheduled departure date, JPRA informed the team that all three team members should leave Iraq. 
(U) The same day the JPRA team returned home from Iraq, a copy of the JPRA HVT exploitation CONOP was sent to CAPT Donovan, the JFCOM SJA.  CAPT Donovan commented on the CONOP in a September 26, 2003 email to Col Moulton, JPRA Deputy Commander John Atkins, OSO Chief Christopher Wirts and others, and circulated a version of the CONOP with his edits and comments.
(U) In his email, CAPT Donovan stated that JPRA should not rely on the March 6, 2003 Working Group report as "authoritative DoD guidance." He wrote that, although the Secretary had approved certain counter-resistance techniques during interrogations of unlawful combatants at GTMO, not all of the techniques listed in the Working Group report had been approved for use.  CAPT Donovan also raised serious concerns about the legality of the interrogation techniques in the CONOP emphasizing that, unlike in Afghanistan and at GTMO, the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq. He wrote:
Unlike OEF-Afghanistan, in which the Taliban and Al-Qaida enemy 'forces' were all deemed to be UNLAWFUL combatants NOT legally entitled to the full protections of the Geneva conventions, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was executed as a CONVENTIONAL armed conflict in which the vast majority of enemy forces were LAWFUL combatants. Therefore, almost all captured personnel within Iraq are legally entitled to either prisoner of war (POW) or civilian internee (CI) status which means they get the full protections of the Geneva Conventions. Many of the counter-resistance techniques approved by SECDEF for use on UNLAWFUL combatants detained at GTMO would not/not be legal under the Geneva Conventions if applied to POWs or CIs in Iraq. 
[Delete] In editing the CONOP, CAPT Donovan not only struck references to several interrogation techniques that had been included in the March 6, 2003 draft Working Group report, but also noted that even those techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO might not be lawful for use on detainees in Iraq. 
[Delete] CAPT Donovan also substantially revised JPRA's "critical operational exploitation principles" by, for example, adding that detainee treatment must be "in accordance with the approved [Rules of Engagement]" and clarifying that Rules of Engagement must be within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to - the Torture Convention.  CAPT Donovan struck JPRA's reference to "constant sensory deprivation" completely, noting that the technique was neither approved by the March 6, 2003 Working Group report nor by the Secretary of Defense in his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM. 
[Delete] Days later, CAPT Donovan raised his concerns about the CONOP to LTG Wagner, JFCOM's Deputy Commander, and Maj Gen James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of Staff, in anticipation of a scheduled visit by the two to JPRA  CAPT Donovan stated that while it made "a certain amount of sense to seek JPRA's advice regarding interrogation techniques that [had] been successfully used against us by our enemies," he was concerned that the SMU TF "may have gone a bit further by asking JPRA to develop a CONOP for "more effective" interrogations [by the SMU] of HVTs captured in Iraq."  He expressed particular concerns with the "interrogation techniques" included in the CONOP:
A number of the 'interrogation techniques' suggested by JPRA in their draft CONOP are highly aggressive (such as the 'water board') and it probably goes without saying that if JPRA is to include such techniques in a CONOP they prepare for an operational unit in another [Area of Responsibility], they need to be damn sure they're appropriate in both a legal and a policy sense. 
(U) In May 2004, the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) initiated a review of DoD directed reports of detainee abuse.  As part of that review, the DoD IG looked into JPRA's "offensive" interrogation support. In response to questions from the DoD IG, CAPT Alan Kaufman, the JFCOM SJA, initiated an inquiry into JPRA's September 2003 support to the SMU TF in Iraq. According to CAPT Kaufman, the scope of the JFCOM inquiry was narrow, focusing only on whether or not the incidents described in Lt Col Kleinman's trip report had been reported up the chain of command to JFCOM.  On September 23, 2005, after JFCOM concluded its inquiry, JFCOM's Deputy Commander LTG Wagner sent a memo to the DoD IG stating:
This command looked into the information flow between the requesting unit, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, (JPRA) and the chain of command at USJFCOM with regard to JPRA's participation in the two subject missions to assist in the global war on terror. While most requests and decisions were verbal, I concluded that information did flow up the chain of command to the appropriate authority.
Action was taken based on JPRA Commanding Officer's (CO) judgment and input from the chain of command ... 
(U) The memo continued:
The actions Lt Col Kleinman witnessed did occur. However, all others involved, including the JPRA [Commanding Officer] and the [Commanding Officer] of the task force believed them to be authorized actions under the existing decisions by DoD General Counsel. The [Commanding Officer] conveyed this to Lt Col Kleinman both during and after the deployment. Lt Col Kleinman did not seek any other response or relief, nor take any issue up his chain of command. 
(U) During the summer of 2003 Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) assumed control of coalition forces in Iraq from its predecessor, the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). The Commander of CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, said that when he took over from CFLCC he identified deficiencies with existing intelligence operations.  LTG Sanchez said that he participated in regular video teleconferences and phone calls with CENTCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) during which he shared his concerns about his command's intelligence capabilities and asked for assistance. LTG Sanchez stated:
I was very concerned about our ability to really push the envelope to the limits of our authority in interrogations. I went back to Washington and said "You've got to send us some help because this is a problem that is way beyond anything we could imagine and it's a problem that hasn't been faced by our Army." 
(U) Even before the CJTF-7 Commander sought assistance, however, discussions had apparently taken place about whether to send MG Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, to Iraq to assess operations there. In May 2003, before CJTF-7 took command in Iraq from CFLCC, LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) at the Joint Staff told MG Miller that a request would be forthcoming for him to lead an assessment trip to Iraq.  According to an investigation conducted by MG George Fay and LTG Anthony Jones, the Joint Staff later requested that SOUTHCOM send a team to assist CENTCOM and the Iraq Survey Group "with advice on facilities and operations specific to screening, interrogations, HUMINT collection, and interagency integration in the short and long term." 
(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) Stephen Cambone said that MG Miller was asked to go to Iraq "at my encouragement, to take a look at the situation as it existed there."  LTG William Boykin, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighter Support said that the decision to send MG Miller to Iraq was made in a meeting that included USDI Cambone and the Secretary of Defense. 
[Delete] From August 31 to September 10, 2003, MG Miller led a team to assess intelligence operations in Iraq.  The JTF-GTMO Commander was accompanied by several JTF-GTMO and former JTF-GTMO staff, including LTC Diane Beaver, the former SJA, and David Becker, the former Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief. Additionally, MG Miller brought representatives from the CIA and the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF). MG Miller said that the purpose of his trip was to "make an assessment for the chain of command," about the ability of U.S. forces in Iraq to conduct "strategic interrogation and intelligence development and detention operations in theater." 
(U) The day after arriving in Iraq, MG Miller met with LTG Sanchez and described the purpose of the assistance visit,  MG Miller said that his team was aware that the Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq and told LTG Sanchez that he would have to decide what recommendations were applicable to his command. MG Miller also met with MG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Director of Intelligence, and gave her the same briefing.
(U) Following an initial visit to the Corps Holding Area at Camp Cropper, MG Miller's assessment team visited the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) facilities.  The ISG was established in June 2003 with the mission to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of weapons of mass destruction and to provide support to the CIA special Advisor.  As part of its effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG interrogated and debriefed high value detainees, such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime.  When MG Miller's team arrived at the facility, they received a briefing from ISG personnel, toured the facilities, and observed ongoing operations. 
(U) Chief Warrant Officer Brian Searcy, who was Chief of Interrogation at the ISG accompanied MG Miller and his team on the tour. CWO Searcy told the Committee that during the tour, MG Miller remarked that the ISG was "running a country club" and suggested that they were too lenient with detainees.  He said that MG Miller recommended the ISG shackle detainees and make them walk on gravel rather than on concrete pathways to show the detainees who was in control. CWO Searcy also recalled that the JTF-GTMO Commander suggested that the ISG "GTMO-ize" their facility. 
(U) MG Miller did not recall referring to the ISG as a "country club" and said that, as far as he knew, he "never used the word GTMO-ize."  However, he did recall telling ISG personnel that he was troubled that the ISG were treating detainees with too much respect, which was not, in his opinion, how prisoners ought to be treated. 
(U) Mike Kamin, the ISG's Collection Manager said that Lt Col Ken Rapuano, the ISG's Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIOC) Chief, was "energized" after meeting with MG Miller and said that the GTMO Commander had told him about techniques like temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation.  According to Mr. Kamin, ISG JIDC personnel balked at the idea of implementing such techniques. [Delete] an ISG strategic debriefer said that he wrote a letter to his chain of command stating that he would resign if the techniques were implemented. 
(U) Lt Col Rapuano said that he met with MG Miller and members of his team in a meeting with MG Keith Dayton, the ISG Commander, and other members of ISG's leadership. Lt Col Rapuano said that he did not recall a discussion of specific interrogation techniques but did recall "some discussion of procedures for air conditioning cells."  Lt Col Rapuano said did not recall any discussions of sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique.
(U) At the end of the visit, MG Miller met with MG Dayton and members of his staff. MG Dayton said that MG Miller told him that the ISG was "not getting much out of these people" and was "not getting the maximum."  MG Dayton said he asked what was meant by that and was told "you haven't broken [the detainees]" psychologically.  MG Dayton said that MG Miller told him that he would "get back to you with some ideas of how you can perhaps deal with these people where you can actually break them, some techniques you can use."  The ISG Commander stated:
I remember very clearly saying, "Geoff, slow down. We're not changing anything right now. You know, we think we're within the rules. If you want me to change something, you give me something in writing that you think needs to be changed. I'll have my lawyers look at it. 
(U) Although MG Miller recalled saying that he was troubled that detainees at the ISG were being treated with too much respect, he did not recall using the term "break."  As to techniques to get more information from detainees, MG Miller said he only recalled discussing the possibility of ISG interrogating detainees more frequently. According to MG Dayton, MG Miller never followed up with him after the trip. 
[Delete] Following the visit to the ISG, MG Miller, John Antonitis, the former Director of the Joint Interrogation Group at JTF-GTMO, and the Superintendent of Camp Delta at JTF-GTMO, visited the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) facility. [Delete] the SMU TF Commander, said he had contacted MG Miller at JTF-GTMO to request assistance with his detention and interrogation operations.  MG Miller, however, said that [delete] did not request the visit and that visiting the SMU TF was not even on his initial itinerary.  In fact, MG Miller described [delete] as not "open" to a visit and said that when his staff called the SMU TF to schedule the visit, they initially said "no" to the visit.
[Delete] MG Miller said that he and two other members of his team met with [delete] and a few of his operators for about 45 minutes to an hour at the SMU TF facility.  The JTF-GTMO Commander did not see an SOP for SMU TF interrogations and recalled that the SMU TF Commander told him the SMU TF was using operators as interrogators. MG Miller said that he told [delete] that he needed to establish interrogation authorities and obtain qualified interrogators. For several months prior to his meeting with MG Miller, SMU TF Legal Advisors had tried, without success, to get [delete] to sign an interrogation policy for the facility under his command. 
[Delete] While she did not accompany the JTF-GTMO Commander on his visit to the SMU TF, LTC Beaver, the former JTF-GTMO SJA, said that a Legal Advisor for the SMU TF contacted her and arranged to meet with her at Camp Victory.  According to LTC Beaver, the SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns with her about physical violence being used by SMU TF personnel during interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees.  He told her that he was "risking his life" by talking to her about these issues.  LTC Beaver told the Committee that the SMU Legal Advisor said he had also raised these issues with the Commander of the SMU TF, but that was not receptive to his concerns.
[Delete] LTC Beaver told the Committee that she informed both COL Marc Warren (the CJTF-7 SJA) and MG Miller about her conversation with the SMU TF Legal Advisor.  When he met with the Committee, MG Miller did not recall LTC Beaver bringing those concerns to his attention.  A slide presentation summarizing the GTMO assessment team's visit to Iraq, however, stated that there were "concerns about [SMU TF] interrogation practices such as physical contact and choking."  The same presentation noted that other governmental agencies "won't interrogate at [the SMU TF] facility because of current treatment concerns." 
(U) During their assessment visit, the JTF-GTMO Commander's team held several meetings with CJTF-7 interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib and Camp Victory. According to COL Thomas Pappas, the 205th MI BDE Commander, conversations with MG Miller focused on the range of intelligence capabilities that would enable effective interrogations.  COL Pappas stated that the "tenor of the discussions was that we had to get tougher with the detainees." 
(U) CPT Wood, the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at Abu Ghraib said her conversations with the JTF-GTMO Commander "centered on renovations and improvements of facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased [Military Police/Military Intelligence] cooperation."  CPT Wood believed that MG Miller and his team wanted to build a "miniature Guantanamo Bay."  In her view, however, the GTMO concept was not applicable to Abu Ghraib. She stated:
... Abu Ghraib wasn't GTMO. The prison was an austere environment; it was not conducive to interrogation operations like GMTO. That was actually built and designed to facilitate interrogation operations. We didn't have the MP force that was necessary for such a high population and we were frequent targets of small arms and mortar attacks. We worked in a hundred and thirty degree weather without air conditioning and we went through the winter without heat. Most of the detainees were not of intelligence value. 
(U) MG Miller said that he spent parts of three days at Abu Ghraib with COL Pappas and CPT Wood discussing how to improve operations.  LTG Sanchez recalled that the team "recommended the creation of a command policy" on interrogations and the team provided CJTF-7 with electronic copies of SOPs and a copy of a Joint Staff policy memorandum entitled "Interrogation Techniques in the War on Terrorism."  According to MG Miller, members of his assessment team also discussed interrogation authorities and techniques during their meetings with CJTF-7 personnel. 
(U) CPT Wood said that members of the GTMO assessment team had, in their possession, copies of the proposed interrogation policy she had copied from the SMU Task Force's interrogation policy and submitted to her chain of command prior to the assessment team's visit.  That proposed policy included presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control.  CPT Wood said that a member of the GTMO assessment team referred to her proposal as a "good start," but told her that CJTF-7 "should consider something along the lines of what's approved for use in [GTMO]."  LTC Beaver recalled reviewing CPT Wood's proposed SOP. LTC Beaver said that she was concerned about the SOP because she knew that, "in a Geneva setting, it was potentially a problem," that she brought it to the attention of COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA and recommended that he review it. 
(U) David Becker, the former JTF-GTMO ICE Chief, recalled discussing stress positions, dogs, and nudity with COL Pappas during the visit. Mr. Becker said:
[W]hat I told Pappas was, look I understand they're doing all kinds of different approaches out there. And I talked about the memo that was approved for Guantanamo at one point. I said look, when you use stress positions; when you use dogs; when you use - I mean when you use stress positions, dogs, nakedness . . . the concept of the conversation was as you develop these techniques, talk to the interrogators. Figure out what they want to use and put it in writing. And you have to establish left and right lanes in the road for the conduct of interrogations. And you've got to do it in writing. And then you've got to build the interrogation plan and you've got the interrogators to stick to it. And that's what I said. And the "use of dogs" came up in that conversation. 
(U) COL Pappas recalled discussions with the GTMO assessment team about dogs being "effective in doing interrogations with Arabs" and talk of "Arabs being fearful of dogs."  COL Pappas said that while no one from MG Miller's team said "okay, use the dogs while you're doing an interrogation" there was discussion "about 'setting conditions for interrogations.'"  COL Pappas later authorized the use of dogs in interrogations at Abu Ghraib. 
(U) COL Pappas also recalled discussing dogs with MG Miller during the visit. In a February 2004 interview, COL Pappas said that the use of dogs had been "a technique that [he] had discussed with Miller" during the JTF-GTMO assistance visit to Iraq.  COL Pappas stated that MG Miller "said that they used military working dogs, and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for which ... you could get information."  In a later interview, COL Pappas again described his discussions with MG Miller:
There was never any discussion [with the JTF-GTMO Commander] of the execution of how the dogs would be used. Now he did say that dogs were an effective technique to use with the detainees. He did say we want to make sure we control the detainee at all times. The I-bolts in the floor came from MG Miller's team ... He did meet with some of the interrogators and told them to be more aggressive, but he never told them how. His overtone was to be more aggressive, but I never heard him say take dogs into the booths or anything like that. 
(U) MAT David DiNenna, the Operations Officer (8-3) of the 320th MP BN also recalled a discussion with MG Miller about dogs. According to MAT DiNenna, during a meeting at Abu Ghraib, MG Miller asked him whether or not they had military working dogs.  MAT DiNenna told MG Miller that they did not, but that he had "requested them when [he] first arrived at Abu [Ghraib], and since that time, had made numerous requests."  MAJ DiNenna said:
MG Miller then looked at COL Pappas and stated that dogs have been extremely useful at GITMO. He stated, "These people are scared to death of dogs, and the dogs have a tremendous affect." 
(U) MAJ DiNenna said that he was "concerned that [MG Miller] was implying MI would receive the dogs at Abu [Ghraib], yet I desperately needed them as a force multiplier for the facilities." 
(U) MGMiller maintained that he and COL Pappas "never discussed using dogs in interrogations."  He stated that his discussions about dogs with COL Pappas were "in the context of security operations and force protection."  MG Miller said, however, that he did not discuss the use of dogs at all with BG Janis Karpinski, the Commander of the 800th MP BDE or anyone else in her unit, which was responsible for security operations and force protection at the prison. 
(U) During his assessment visit, the JTF-GTMO Commander provided an "interim update" to LTG Sanchez and recommended that CJTF-7 "establish interrogation authorities so the interrogators understand what their limits are."  MG Miller stated that he also directed LTC Beaver to "let [CJTF-7] see what we use at Guantanamo as a template," referring to the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM.  MG Miller stated that, with respect to GTMO's guidance from the Secretary, he told LTG Sanchez:
[T]he first caveat was that the Geneva Convention applied here. You must use only Geneva Convention authorities. You may not use anything other unless you get approval from SecDef to go about doing that. And so if you're going to ask for any of those, you got to go through the CENTCOM Commander and up to JCS and OSD to get approval from there. 
(U) LTG Sanchez said that he instructed his SJA to develop an interrogation policy, the "key purpose" of which was to "unequivocally establish as policy adherence to the Geneva Convention and to regulate approach techniques that we believed were derived from multiple sources" including the Army Field Manual, and techniques used in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. 
(U) LTC Beaver said that she left the April 16, 2003 memo from Secretary Rumsfeld with the CJTF-7 legal staff. She also said that she told COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA, and other lawyers on the CJTF-7 staff that while the policy had worked at Guantanamo, that CJTF-7 "would need to evaluate what was permissible in Iraq and what the command thought would work in this environment." 
(U) According to COL Pappas, CJTF-7 began drafting an interrogation policy while MG Miller and his assessment team were still in Iraq.  He said that LTC Beaver, and several CJTF-7 lawyers worked on a memo at Camp Victory. MG Miller said that, while he did not know who actually drafted the memo, LTC Beaver told him that she worked on the issue with COL Warren and his staff.  LTC Beaver did not recall working on an interrogation policy during the assessment visit. 
[Delete] At the conclusion of the assessment trip, MG Miller produced a trip report that described the team's findings.  The trip report echoed what the JTF-GTMO Commander had told LTG Sanchez and MG Fast with regard to interrogation guidelines. The report stated "the team observed that the Task Force [CJTF-7] did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq."  While the report did not discuss specific interrogation approaches or techniques, it did recommend ways in which the CJTF could improve the interrogation process:
Interrogations are [being] conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate detention operations, interrogation operations, and collection management under one command authority. 
(U) Subsequent to the assessment trip, six GTMO personnel - three interrogators and three analysts - were sent to Abu Ghraib to assist in implementing the GTMO recommendations and in establishing a Joint Intelligence and Debriefing Center. 
(U) MG Miller presented his trip report to SOUTHCOM and was subsequently told that it was forwarded to the Joint Staff and OSD.  He was subsequently directed to brief senior Department of Defense officials on his assessment visit and the report. MG Miller told the Army Inspector General (IG) that the briefing took place in October and was attended by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steven Cambone, as well as senior military officers including LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for Intelligence at the Joint Staff. According to MG Miller, his briefing covered "the ability of the CJTF-7 to be able to execute the strategic interrogation mission to develop intelligence, actual intelligence and an assessment of CJTF-7's ability to detain civilian detainees in accordance with the Geneva Convention and ARI90-8."  Following the briefing, the GTMO Commander met privately with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone. 
(U) While MG Miller said that Under Secretary Cambone attended the briefing, Under Secretary Cambone testified on May 11, 2004 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was, in fact "not briefed" by the GTMO Commander on the trip report.  In his written answer to a question for the record following his testimony, Under Secretary Cambone stated that, in fact, he "was never officially briefed on MG Miller's report."  Just over a week after Under Secretary Cambone's testimony, MG Miller testified before the Committee that he had "no direct discussions" with Under Secretary Cambone following his visit to Iraq. 
(U) In August 2004, however, MG Miller told Army Investigators that, following his return from Iraq he "gave an outbrief to both Dr. Wolfowitz and Secretary Cambone."  The GTMO Commander went on to state ''the meeting that I had with Secretary Cambone had occurred after I returned... The discussion generally was about how we could improve the flow of intelligence from Iraq through and in interrogations." 
(U) More than a year later, in October 2005, the Army IG asked MG Miller about his testimony to the Committee that he had not had "direct discussions" with Under Secretary Cambone. Despite previously describing a "discussion" with Under Secretary Cambone, MG Miller told the IG that when asked at [the Senate Armed Services Committee] about discussions with Under Secretary Cambone after his trip, "I said no because I didn't have discussions with Cambone."  MG Miller also told the Army IG that he didn't even know that the person attending the meeting was Dr. Cambone until Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz used his name."  The Army IG also asked MG Miller about the smaller meeting that he attended with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone immediately following his briefing. MG Miller said that the reason for the smaller meeting was so that he could give the ''unvarnished truth" about his visit and said that he told Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone during that smaller meeting that CJTF-7 was at risk for "mission failure." 
(U) Under Secretary Cambone stated in December 2006 that his records indicated that he "did attend MG Miller's briefing to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz," but that he did "not remember participating in any substantive discussions." Under Secretary Cambone said that he had "no personal recollection" of the smaller meeting that took place subsequent to MG Miller's briefing. 
(U) During his December 20, 2007 interview with Committee staff, MG Miller said that he did not learn that Under Secretary Cambone was in attendance at the briefing until someone referred to him by name either during or after his briefing.  He stated that, when he was asked at the May 2004 Committee hearing about discussions with Under Secretary Cambone, he had forgotten that Under Secretary Cambone had actually attended the briefing. MG Miller said his use of the word "discussion" in his August 2004 testimony to describe his interaction with Undersecretary Cambone was an imprecise use of words. MG Miller stated that, in the smaller meeting he attended following his briefing with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Undersecretary Cambone, that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz simply thanked him for his work.
(U) On September 14, 2003, less than a week after MG Miller's team left Iraq, LTG Sanchez issued the first CJTF-7 "Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy." The September 14, 2003 policy stated that the Geneva Conventions were applicable in Iraq and that Coalition Forces "will continue to treat all persons under their control humanely."  LTG Sanchez stated that he issued the policy because FM 34-52 left the "universe of approaches to the imagination of the interrogator" and demanded additional structure. 
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, the September 14, 2003 policy "drew heavily" on the Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for GTMO.  Indeed, the September 14, 2003 policy included all 24 interrogation techniques that were in that guidance, as well as techniques that CPT Wood had copied from the SMU TF in Iraq's interrogation policy and submitted for approval. The latter included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, loud music, and light control.  The techniques CPT Wood had copied from the SMU TF policy had, in turn, been based on techniques included in the interrogation policy used by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. That policy was influenced, in turn, by the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 approval of aggressive interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. 
(U) Although some of the techniques authorized by the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 policy required the CJTF-7 Commander's approval before they could be used on Enemy prisoners of War (EPWs), LTG Sanchez stated that "with few exceptions, persons captured after May 1, 2003 were not entitled to EPW status as a matter of law."  CPT Wood said that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. 
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that CJTF-7 forwarded the September 14, 2003 policy to CENTCOM with a cover memorandum stating that the policy was based on that used at Guantanamo Bay, but "modified for applicability to a theater of war in which the Geneva Conventions apply."  LTG Sanchez stated that his intent, unless otherwise directed, was to "immediately implement the policy outlined in the memo." 
(U) The September 14, 2003 policy went into effect for interrogators at Abu Ghraib as soon as it was issued. CPT Wood stated that she briefed the new policy for all of the [number of] interrogators and analysts working for her. She stated that during the briefing, "the interrogators took turns reading [the September 14 policy] line by line aloud."  She stated that each interrogator present signed a document noting that he or she had received training on the policy. CPT Wood said that personnel who arrived at Abu Ghraib after CJTF-7 issued the policy were briefed on it during in- processing.
(U) CPT Wood also developed a Memorandum for Record on CJTF-7 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) to be signed by all personnel at Abu Ghraib in contact with detainees.  The IROE stated that the interrogation approaches specified in Army FM 34-52, as well as yelling, light control, loud music, deception, and false flag were "approved for all detainees, regardless of status (security detainees, civilian internees, or EPWs)."  Use of other approaches authorized by the September 14, 2003 CJTF-7 memorandum, including stress positions, presence of dogs, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, and sleep management, were to be approved by the interrogation officer in charge or the noncommissioned officer in charge.
(U) At least one version of the IROE used a September 10, 2003 CJTF-7 draft policy as its basis, rather than the September 14 approved policy.  That IROE also listed sensory deprivation as "approved in accordance with the CJTF-7 policy."  While CPT Wood had requested sensory deprivation and the technique had been included in a September 10, 2003 draft policy, it was not among those listed in the September 14, 2003 policy approved by CJTF-7. CPT Wood acknowledged that she may have used the wrong policy as a basis for her IROE. 
(U) LTG Sanchez said that when he issued the September 14, 2003 policy, there was agreement in the CJTF-7 legal community that the techniques in the policy were lawful. He said that that consensus was developed in the absence of guidance from CENTCOM, who he said believed the issue was too contentious and would not give CJTF-7 legal guidance.  LTG Sanchez said that ''time was of the essence" so he "decided to publish the September memorandum knowing that discussions were ongoing as to the legality of some of the approaches included in the memorandum." 
[Delete] LTG Sanchez stated that when the September 14, 2003 policy reached CENTCOM, it "energized the legal community there and that COL Fred Pribble [the CENTCOM SJA] had concerns."  LTG Sanchez said that CENTCOM lawyers thought some techniques in the September 14 policy came too close to the boundary.  COL Marc Warren, the CJTF-7 SJA, stated that the CENTCOM SJA "raised concerns to us that the policy was objectionable in that aspects of the approved approaches were impermissibly coercive." 
[Delete] On September 15, 2003, the day after the policy was issued, COL Warren sent a copy to COL Pribble and William "Barry" Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy SJA, stating "this is pretty tame stuff, largely a direct lift from the Army Interrogation FM. The genesis of this product was the visit by MG Miller's GITMO team."  The next day, Mr. Hammill asked Major Carrie Ricci, the Chief of International Law at CENTCOM to review the policy.  That same day, MAJ Ricci responded in an email stating that "Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III and IV and should not be used on [enemy prisoners of war] or [civilian internees]. The [Geneva Conventions] prohibits all coercive interrogation techniques." 
[Delete] On September 17, 2003, COL Pribble sent a copy of MAJ Ricci's email to COL Warren who responded that "almost all of these techniques are right out of the Field Manual and are in use now."  That same day, MAJ Ricci responded:
Gentlemen, it's the techniques that are not in the field manual that concern me. Techniques such as dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, sleep management, yelling, loud music, light control, stress positions, etc. many of these techniques appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III, Article 17: ''No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."
... My recommendation is that the interrogation policy be kept in conformity with the [Field Manual] ... I would hesitate to put in writing how we are directing interrogations beyond what is in the [Field Manual]. If CJTF-7 wants to take advantage of the additional measures used at Guantanamo, this should be limited to detainees who are not entitled to [Geneva Convention] protections or else I believe we should still seek SECDEF approval- and I am doubtful some of these techniques will be approved. The policy as written is troublesome. 
[Delete] Later that day, MAJ Ricci spoke with COL Warren by phone.  In a subsequent email to Mr. Hammill she said that COL Warren was "going to try and re-work the policy. He is understandably unhappy that the policy was already signed by the [Commanding General] and now the SJA has the regrettable task of telling the [Commanding General] the policy has problems - but that's what we get paid for." 
[Delete] In a September 22, 2003 email to MAJ Ricci, CENTCOM SJA COL Fred Pribble said "During my sit-down with COL Warren in Baghdad, he was pretty quick to admit that we (read you) had made the right call and that they would scrub the policy." 
[Delete] LTG Sanchez said that after CJTF-7 and CENTCOM lawyers began to debate the policy that he and COL Warren again reviewed the memo. LTG Sanchez stated that COL Warren told him:
"Yes, they are legal. There is some dissent and different opinions within the legal community. Some of these may be harsher than others, and in order for us to eliminate debate and get consensus, we probably ought to put some of these aside, and oh, by the way, they probably wouldn't get us too much anyway if we implemented them." I said "Okay, fine let's get consensus. Go ahead and constrain it (the September policy)." 
(U) On October 12, 2003, nearly a month after MAJ Ricci's concerns were brought to COL Warren's attention, LTG Sanchez issued a revised interrogation policy, eliminating all techniques not listed in either the 1987 or 1992 versions of the Army Field manual. Techniques removed from the list of authorized techniques included dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, presence of military working dogs, sleep management, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control.  CJTF-7 also removed isolation and added "segregation" to the new policy. The October 12, 2003 policy stated that the CJTF-7 Commanding General had to approve segregation in all cases exceeding "30 days in duration, whether consecutive or nonconsecutive." 
(U) CJTF-7 removed ''the presence of military dogs" from the list of interrogation techniques in the October 12, 2003 policy, but added a line in the "General Safeguards" section of the policy stating that "Should working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under the control of a handler at all times to ensure safety."  Despite references to dogs in both the September 14, 2003 interrogation policy and the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy, LTG Sanchez said that the "intent for the use of dogs was always focused on the security contributions they make in a detention facility" and that there was "no explicit direction, guidance, or condoning of the use of unmuzzled dogs in the conduct of interrogations."  LTG Sanchez acknowledged that placement of "presence of military working dogs" in the interrogation techniques section of the September 14 policy was "confusing."  He said that he removed the "presence of military working dogs" from the list of interrogation techniques in the October policy and put it in the general safeguards section to make it "clear that using dogs for the deliberate purpose of frightening a detainee was not permitted." 
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that "It is certainly clear under the October 2003 policy that the use of military working dogs in interrogations would require an exception to policy granted by me."  COL Pappas stated, however, that he believed that the October 12, 2003 interrogation policy "delegated to me the authority to approve the use of muzzled dogs." 
(U) The October 12, 2003 policy also stated that requests to use interrogation approaches not listed in the policy "will be submitted to [the CJTF-7 Commander] through CJTF-7 [Director for Intelligence] and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards." 
(U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that when the October 12, 2003 policy was issued, her interrogators signed a new Interrogation Rules of Engagement Memorandum (IROE).  The new IROE listed all of the techniques identified in the October 12, 2003 policy and stated that they were "approved for all detainees, regardless of status."  The IROE also listed approaches not explicitly approved in the October 12, 2003 policy, but which had to be requested through the Interrogation Officer in Charge to the CJTF-7 Commanding General. The IROE listed nine examples of such techniques, presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sensory deprivation, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, isolation, sleep management, and change of scenery down. 
[Big delete]. On October 16 2003 a new Commander, [delete] took command of the SMU TF. [Delete] stated that he "used his subject matter experts to build the [interrogation] SOP consistent with existing rules and regulations."  This SOP went into effect on October 25, 2003. The Department of Defense has not provided the Committee with a copy of the October 25, 2003 SMU TF SOP. 
[Delete] According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, however, the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy included ten interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual.  Those techniques included controlled fear (muzzled dogs), stress positions, sleep deprivation/adjustment, environmental manipulation, yelling, loud music, and light control, removal of comfort items, isolation, false documents/report, multiple interrogator, and repeat and control.  Less than two weeks before the policy was finalized, several of these techniques, including environmental manipulation, stress positions, muzzled dogs, and sleep adjustment had been removed from CJTF-7's interrogation SOP after CENTCOM raised legal concerns about them. 
[Delete. Despite having been included in the October 25, 2003 SMU TF policy, which he approved, [delete] indicated to DoD investigators in June 2004 that he had not approved "environmental manipulation" or "presence of military working dogs." 
[Delete] There is evidence that at least one technique that was not in the SOP - removal of clothing - was in use at the SMU TF in late 2003. [Delete] stated that when he took command in October 2003, he "discovered that some of the detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique [big delete]."  He said that he did not know where the technique came from.  Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however, JPRA instructors had stripped a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as part of an interrogation.  Terrence Russell, the JPRA training manager who was part of the JPRA team of instructors at the SMU TF, said that the detainee was stripped [big delete]."  Mr. Russell stated that ''we've done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students." 
[Big delete] stated that he was ''uncomfortable'' with stripping detainees and that "stripping a detainee just didn't seem right to [him] even though arguably, it was an effective technique."  He said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004.
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