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Introduction
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS was born on
April 26, A.D. 121. His real name was M. Annius Verus, and he was sprung
of a noble family which claimed descent from Numa, second King of Rome.
Thus the most religious of emperors came of the blood of the most pious
of early kings. His father, Annius Verus, had held high office in Rome,
and his grandfather, of the same name, had been thrice Consul. Both his
parents died young, but Marcus held them in loving remembrance. On his
father's death Marcus was adopted by his grandfather, the consular
Annius Verus, and there was deep love between these two. On the very
first page of his book Marcus gratefully declares how of his grandfather
he had learned to be gentle and meek, and to refrain from all anger and
passion. The Emperor Hadrian divined the fine character of the lad, whom
he used to call not Verus but Verissimus, more Truthful than his own
name. He advanced Marcus to equestrian rank when six years of age, and
at the age of eight made him a member of the ancient Salian priesthood.
The boy's aunt, Annia Galeria Faustina, was married to Antoninus Pius,
afterwards emperor. Hence it came about that Antoninus, having no son,
adopted Marcus, changing his name to that which he is known by, and
betrothed him to his daughter Faustina. His education was conducted with
all care. The ablest teachers were engaged for him, and he was trained
in the strict doctrine of the Stoic philosophy, which was his great
delight. He was taught to dress plainly and to live simply, to avoid all
softness and luxury. His body was trained to hardihood by wrestling,
hunting, and outdoor games; and though his constitution was weak, he
showed great personal courage to encounter the fiercest boars. At the
same time he was kept from the extravagancies of his day. The great
excitement in Rome was the strife of the Factions, as they were called,
in the circus. The racing drivers used to adopt one of four colours --
red, blue, white, or green -- and their partisans showed an eagerness in
supporting them which nothing could surpass. Riot and corruption went in
the train of the racing chariots; and from all these things Marcus held
severely aloof.
In 140 Marcus was raised to the
consulship, and in 145 his betrothal was consummated by marriage. Two
years later Faustina brought him a daughter; and soon after the
tribunate and other imperial honours were conferred upon him.
Antoninus Pius died in 161, and Marcus
assumed the imperial state. He at once associated with himself L.
Ceionius Commodus, whom Antoninus had adopted as a younger son at the
same time with Marcus, giving him the name of Lucius Aurelius Verus.
Henceforth the two are colleagues in the empire, the junior being
trained as it were to succeed. No sooner was Marcus settled upon the
throne than wars broke out on all sides. In the east, Vologeses III. of
Parthia began a long-meditated revolt by destroying a whole Roman Legion
and invading Syria (162). Verus was sent off in hot haste to quell this
rising; and he fulfilled his trust by plunging into drunkenness and
debauchery, while the war was left to his officers. Soon after Marcus
had to face a more serious danger at home in the coalition of several
powerful tribes on the northern frontier. Chief among those were the
Marcomanni or Marchmen, the Quadi (mentioned in this book), the
Sarmatians, the Catti, the Jazyges. In Rome itself there was pestilence
and starvation, the one brought from the east by Verus's legions, the
other caused by floods which had destroyed vast quantities of grain.
After all had been done possible to allay famine and to supply pressing
needs--Marcus being forced even to sell the imperial jewels to find
money--both emperors set forth to a struggle which was to continue more
or less during the rest of Marcus's reign. During these wars, in 169,
Verus died. We have no means of following the campaigns in detail; but
thus much is certain, that in the end the Romans succeeded in crushing
the barbarian tribes, and effecting a settlement which made the empire
more secure. Marcus was himself commander-in-chief, and victory was due
no less to his own ability than to his wisdom in choice of lieutenants,
shown conspicuously in the case of Pertinax. There were several
important battles fought in these campaigns; and one of them has become
celebrated for the legend of the Thundering Legion. In a battle against
the Quadi in 174, the day seemed to he going in favour of the foe, when
on a sudden arose a great storm of thunder and rain the lightning struck
the barbarians with terror, and they turned to rout. In later days this
storm was said to have been sent in answer to the prayers of a legion
which contained many Christians, and the name Thundering Legion should
he given to it on this account. The title of Thundering Legion is known
at an earlier date, so this part of the story at least cannot be true;
but the aid of the storm is acknowledged by one of the scenes carved on
Antonine's Column at Rome, which commemorates these wars.
The settlement made after these troubles
might have been more satisfactory but for an unexpected rising in the
east. Avidius Cassius, an able captain who had won renown in the
Parthian wars, was at this time chief governor of the eastern provinces.
By whatever means induced, he had conceived the project of proclaiming
himself emperor as soon as Marcus, who was then in feeble health, should
die; and a report having been conveyed to him that Marcus was dead,
Cassius did as he had planned. Marcus, on hearing the news, immediately
patched up a peace and returned home to meet this new peril. The
emperors great grief was that he must needs engage in the horrors of
civil strife. He praised the qualities of Cassius, and expressed a
heartfelt wish that Cassius might not be driven to do himself a hurt
before he should have the opportunity to grant a free pardon. But before
he could come to the east news had come to Cassius that the emperor
still lived; his followers fell away from him, and he was assassinated.
Marcus now went to the east, and while there the murderers brought the
head of Cassius to him; but the emperor indignantly refused their gift,
nor would he admit the men to his presence.
On this journey his wife, Faustina, died.
At his return the emperor celebrated a triumph (176). Immediately
afterwards he repaired to Germany, and took up once more the burden of
war. His operations were followed by complete success; but the troubles
of late years had been too much for his constitution, at no time robust,
and on March 17, 180, he died in Pannonia.
The good emperor was not spared domestic
troubles. Faustina had borne him several children, of whom he was
passionately fond. Their innocent faces may still be seen in many a
sculpture gallery, recalling with odd effect the dreamy countenance of
their father. But they died one by one, and when Marcus came to his own
end only one of his sons still lived -- the weak and worthless Commodus.
On his father's death Commodus, who succeeded him, undid the work of
many campaigns by a hasty and unwise peace; and his reign of twelve
years proved him to be a ferocious and bloodthirsty tyrant. Scandal has
made free with the name of Faustina herself, who is accused not only of
unfaithfulness, but of intriguing with Cassius and egging him on to his
fatal rebellion, it must be admitted that these charges rest on no sure
evidence; and the emperor, at all events, loved her dearly, nor ever
felt the slightest qualm of suspicion.
As a soldier we have seen that Marcus was
both capable and successful; as an administrator he was prudent and
conscientious. Although steeped in the teachings of philosophy, he did
not attempt to remodel the world on any preconceived plan. He trod the
path beaten by his predecessors, seeking only to do his duty as well as
he could, and to keep out corruption. He did some unwise things, it is
true. To create a compeer in empire, as he did with Verus, was a
dangerous innovation which could only succeed if one of the two effaced
himself; and under Diocletian this very precedent caused the Roman
Empire to split into halves. He erred in his civil administration by too
much centralising. But the strong point of his reign was the
administration of justice. Marcus sought by-laws to protect the weak, to
make the lot of the slaves less hard, to stand in place of father to the
fatherless. Charitable foundations were endowed for rearing and
educating poor children. The provinces were protected against
oppression, and public help was given to cities or districts which might
be visited by calamity. The great blot on his name, and one hard indeed
to explain, is his treatment of the Christians. In his reign Justin at
Rome became a martyr to his faith, and Polycarp at Smyrna, and we know
of many outbreaks of fanaticism in the provinces which caused the death
of the faithful. It is no excuse to plead that he knew nothing about the
atrocities done in his name: it was his duty to know, and if he did not
he would have been the first to confess that he had failed in his duty.
But from his own tone in speaking of the Christians it is clear he knew
them only from calumny; and we hear of no measures taken even to secure
that they should have a fair hearing. In this respect Trajan was better
than he.
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"A young baby is
covered over with flour, the object being to deceive the
unwary. It is then served to the person to be admitted to
the rites. The recruit is urged to inflict blows upon it
which appear to be harmless because of the covering of
flour. Thus the baby is killed with wounds that remain
unseen and concealed. It is the blood of the infant -- I
shudder to mention it -- it is this blood that they lick
with thirsty lips; the limbs they distribute eagerly; this
is the victim by which they seal the covenant." (Fronto,
para. by Minucius Felix, Octavius 9.5-6)....
"On a special day they gather in a feast with all their
children, sisters, mothers, all sexes and ages. There,
flushed with the banquet after such feasting and drinking,
they begin to burn with incestuous passions. They provoke a
dog tied to a lampstand to leap and bound toward a scrap of
food, which they have tossed outside the reach of his chain.
By this means the lamp is overturned and extinguished and
with it common knowledge of their actions; in the shameless
dark and with unspeakable lust they copulate in random
unions, all being equally guilty of incest -- some by deed
but everyone by complicity." (Octavius 9.5-6) |
To a thoughtful mind such a religion as
that of Rome would give small satisfaction. Its legends were often
childish or impossible; its teaching had little to do with morality. The
Roman religion was in fact of the nature of a bargain: men paid certain
sacrifices and rites, and the gods granted their favour, irrespective of
right or wrong. In this case all devout souls were thrown back upon
philosophy, as they had been, though to a less extent, in Greece. There
were under the early empire two rival schools which practically divided
the field between them, Stoicism and Epicureanism. The ideal set before
each was nominally much the same. The Stoics aspired to
the repression of all emotion, and the Epicureans to
,
freedom from all disturbance; yet in the upshot the one has become a
synonym of stubborn endurance, the other for unbridled licence. With
Epicureanism we have nothing to do now; but it will be worth while to
sketch the history and tenets of the Stoic sect.
Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, was born
in Cyprus at some date unknown, but his life may be said roughly to be
between the years 350 and 250 B.C. Cyprus has been from time immemorial
a meeting-place of the East and West, and although we cannot grant any
importance to a possible strain of Phoenician blood in him (for the
Phoenicians were no philosophers), yet it is quite likely that through
Asia Minor he may have come in touch with the Far East. He studied under
the cynic Crates, but he did not neglect other philosophical systems.
After many years' study he opened his own school in a colonnade in
Athens called the Painted Porch, or Stoa, which gave the Stoics their
name. Next to Zeno, the School of the Porch owes most to Chrysippus
(280--207 b.c.), who organised Stoicism into a system. Of him it was
said,
'But for Chrysippus, there had been
no Porch.'
The Stoics regarded speculation as a
means to an end and that end was, as Zeno put it, to live consistently
or as
it was later explained, to live in conformity with nature. This
conforming of the life to nature
was
the Stoic idea of Virtue. This dictum might easily be taken to mean that
virtue consists in yielding to each natural impulse; but that was very
far from the Stoic meaning. In order to live in accord with nature, it
is necessary to know what nature is; and to this end a threefold
division of philosophy is made -- into Physics, dealing with the
universe and its laws, the problems of divine government and teleology;
Logic, which trains the mind to discern true from false; and Ethics,
which applies the knowledge thus gained and tested to practical life.
The Stoic system of physics was
materialism with an infusion of pantheism. In contradiction to Plato's
view that the Ideas, or Prototypes, of phenomena alone really exist, the
Stoics held that material objects alone existed; but immanent in the
material universe was a spiritual force which acted through them,
manifesting itself under many forms, as fire, aether, spirit, soul,
reason, the ruling principle. The universe, then, is God, of whom the
popular gods are manifestations; while legends and myths are
allegorical. The soul of man is thus an emanation from the godhead, into
whom it will eventually be re-absorbed. The divine ruling principle
makes all things work together for good, but for the good of the whole.
The highest good of man is consciously to work with God for the common
good, and this is the sense in which the Stoic tried to live in accord
with nature. In the individual it is virtue alone which enables him to
do this; as Providence rules the universe, so virtue in the soul must
rule man.
In Logic, the Stoic system is noteworthy
for their theory as to the test of truth, the Criterion. They compared
the new-born soul to a sheet of paper ready for writing. Upon this the
senses write their impressions
and by
experience of a number of these the soul unconsciously conceives general
notions
or
anticipations
. When
the impression was such as to be irresistible it was called
one
that holds fast, or as they explained it, one proceeding from truth.
Ideas and inferences artificially produced by deduction or the like were
tested by this 'holding perception.'
Of the Ethical application I have already
spoken. The highest good was the virtuous life. Virtue alone is
happiness, and vice is unhappiness. Carrying this theory to its extreme,
the Stoic said that there could be no gradations between virtue and
vice, though of course each has its special manifestations. Moreover,
nothing is good but virtue, and nothing but vice is bad. Those outside
things which are commonly called good or bad, such as health and
sickness, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain, are to him indifferent
.
All these things are merely the sphere in which virtue may act. The
ideal Wise Man is sufficient unto himself in all things
and
knowing these truths, he will be happy even when stretched upon the
rack. It is probable that no Stoic claimed for himself that he was this
Wise Man, but that each strove after it as an ideal much as the
Christian strives after a likeness to Christ. The exaggeration in this
statement was, however, so obvious, that the later Stoics were driven to
make a further subdivision of things indifferent into what is preferable
and
what is undesirable
. They
also held that for him who had not attained to the perfect wisdom,
certain actions were proper
. These
were neither virtuous nor vicious, but, like the indifferent things,
held a middle place.
Two points in the Stoic system deserve
special mention. One is a careful distinction between things which are
in our power and things which are not. Desire and dislike, opinion and
affection, are within the power of the will; whereas health, wealth,
honour, and other such are general1y not so. The Stoic was called upon
to control his desires and affections, and to guide his opinion; to
bring his whole being under the sway of the will or leading principle,
just as the universe is guided and governed by divine Providence. This
is a special application of the favourite Greek virtue of moderation
, and
has also its parallel in Christian ethics. The second point is a strong
insistence on the unity of the universe, and on man's duty as part of a
great whole. Public spirit was the most splendid political virtue of the
ancient world, and it is here made cosmopolitan. It is again instructive
to note that Christian sages insisted on the same thing. Christians are
taught that they are members of a worldwide brotherhood, where is
neither Greek nor Hebrew, bond nor free and that they live their lives
as fellow-workers with God.
Such is the system which underlies the
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Some knowledge of it is necessary to the
right understanding of the book, but for us the chief interest lies
elsewhere. We do not come to Marcus Aurelius for a treatise on Stoicism.
He is no head of a school to lay down a body of doctrine for students;
he does not even contemplate that others should read what he writes. His
philosophy is not an eager intellectual inquiry, but more what we should
call religious feeling. The uncompromising stiffness of Zeno or
Chrysippus is softened and transformed by passing through a nature
reverent and tolerant, gentle and free from guile; the grim resignation
which made life possible to the Stoic sage becomes in him almost a mood
of aspiration. His book records the innermost thoughts of his heart, set
down to ease it, with such moral maxims and reflections as may help him
to bear the burden of duty and the countless annoyances of a busy life.
It is instructive to compare the
Meditations with another famous book, the Imitation of Christ. There is
the same ideal of self-control in both. It should be a man's task, says
the Imitation, 'to overcome himself, and every day to be stronger than
himself.' 'In withstanding of the passions standeth very peace of
heart.' 'Let us set the axe to the root, that we being purged of our
passions may have a peaceable mind.' To this end there must be continual
self-examination. 'If thou may not continually gather thyself together,
namely sometimes do it, at least once a day, the morning or the evening.
In the morning purpose, in the evening discuss the manner, what thou
hast been this day, in word, work, and thought.' But while the Roman's
temper is a modest self-reliance, the Christian aims at a more passive
mood, humbleness and meekness, and reliance on the presence and personal
friendship of God. The Roman scrutinises his faults with severity, but
without the self-contempt which makes the Christian 'vile in his own
sight.' The Christian, like the Roman, bids 'study to withdraw thine
heart from the love of things visible'; but it is not the busy life of
duty he has in mind so much as the contempt of all worldly things, and
the 'cutting away of all lower delectations.' Both rate men's praise or
blame at their real worthlessness; 'Let not thy peace,' says the
Christian, 'be in the mouths of men.' But it is to God's censure the
Christian appeals, the Roman to his own soul. The petty annoyances of
injustice or unkindness are looked on by each with the same magnanimity.
'Why doth a little thing said or done against thee make thee sorry? It
is no new thing; it is not the first, nor shall it be the last, if thou
live long. At best suffer patiently, if thou canst not suffer joyously.'
The Christian should sorrow more for other men's malice than for our own
wrongs; but the Roman is inclined to wash his hands of the offender.
'Study to be patient in suffering and bearing other men's defaults and
all manner infirmities,' says the Christian; but the Roman would never
have thought to add, 'If all men were perfect, what had we then to
suffer of other men for God?' The virtue of suffering in itself is an
idea which does not meet us in the Meditations. Both alike realise that
man is one of a great community. 'No man is sufficient to himself,' says
the Christian; 'we must bear together, help together, comfort together.'
But while he sees a chief importance in zeal, in exalted emotion that
is, and avoidance of lukewarmness, the Roman thought mainly of the duty
to be done as well as might be, and less of the feeling which should go
with the doing of it. To the saint as to the emperor, the world is a
poor thing at best. 'Verily it is a misery to live upon the earth,' says
the Christian; few and evil are the days of man's life, which passeth
away suddenly as a shadow.
But there is one great difference between
the two books we are considering. The Imitation is addressed to others,
the Meditations by the writer to himself. We learn nothing from the
Imitation of the author's own life, except in so far as he may be
assumed to have practised his own preachings; the Meditations reflect
mood by mood the mind of him who wrote them. In their intimacy and
frankness lies their great charm. These notes are not sermons; they are
not even confessions. There is always an air of self-consciousness in
confessions; in such revelations there is always a danger of
unctuousness or of vulgarity for the best of men. St. Augus-tine is not
always clear of offence, and John Bunyan himself exaggerates venial
peccadilloes into heinous sins. But Marcus Aurelius is neither vulgar
nor unctuous; he extenuates nothing, but nothing sets down in malice. He
never poses before an audience; he may not be profound, he is always
sincere. And it is a lofty and serene soul which is here disclosed
before us. Vulgar vices seem to have no temptation for him; this is not
one tied and bound with chains which he strives to break. The faults he
detects in himself are often such as most men would have no eyes to see.
To serve the divine spirit which is implanted within him, a man must
'keep himself pure from all violent passion and evil affection, from all
rashness and vanity, and from all manner of discontent, either in regard
of the gods or men': or, as he says elsewhere, 'unspotted by pleasure,
undaunted by pain.' Unwavering courtesy and consideration are his aims.
'Whatsoever any man either doth or saith, thou must be good;' 'doth any
man offend? It is against himself that he doth offend: why should it
trouble thee?' The offender needs pity, not wrath; those who must needs
be corrected, should be treated with tact and gentleness; and one must
be always ready to learn better. 'The best kind of revenge is, not to
become like unto them.' There are so many hints of offence forgiven,
that we may believe the notes followed sharp on the facts. Perhaps he
has fallen short of his aim, and thus seeks to call his principles to
mind, and to strengthen himself for the future. That these sayings are
not mere talk is plain from the story of Avidius Cassius, who would have
usurped his imperial throne. Thus the emperor faithfully carries out his
own principle, that evil must be overcome with good. For each fault in
others, Nature (says he) has given us a counteracting virtue; 'as, for
example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness and meekness, as
an antidote.'
One so gentle towards a foe was sure to
be a good friend; and indeed his pages are full of generous gratitude to
those who had served him. In his First Book he sets down to account all
the debts due to his kinsfolk and teachers. To his grandfather he owed
his own gentle spirit, to his father shamefastness and courage; he
learnt of his mother to be religious and bountiful and single-minded.
Rusticus did not work in vain, if he showed his pupil that his life
needed amending. Apollonius taught him simplicity, reasonableness,
gratitude, a love of true liberty. So the list runs on; every one he had
dealings with seems to have given him something good, a sure proof of
the goodness of his nature, which thought no evil.
If his was that honest and true heart
which is the Christian ideal, this is the more wonderful in that he
lacked the faith which makes Christians strong. He could say, it is
true, 'either there is a God, and then all is well; or if all things go
by chance and fortune, yet mayest thou use thine own providence in those
things that concern thee properly; and then art thou well.' Or again,
'We must needs grant that there is a nature that doth govern the
universe.' But his own part in the scheme of things is so small, that he
does not hope for any personal happiness beyond what a serene soul may
win in this mortal life. '0 my soul, the time I trust will be, when thou
shalt be good, simple, more open and visible, than that body by which it
is enclosed;' but this is said of the calm contentment with human lot
which he hopes to attain, not of a time when the trammels of the body
shall be cast off. For the rest, the world and its fame and wealth, 'all
is vanity.' The gods may perhaps have a particular care for him, but
their especial care is for the universe at large: thus much should
suffice. His gods are better than the Stoic gods, who sit aloof from all
human things, untroubled and uncaring, but his personal hope is hardly
stronger. On this point he says little, though there are many allusions
to death as the natural end; doubtless he expected his soul one day to
be absorbed into the universal soul, since nothing comes out of nothing,
and nothing can be annihilated. His mood is one of strenuous weariness;
he does his duty as a good soldier, waiting for the sound of the trumpet
which shall sound the retreat; he has not that cheerful confidence which
led Socrates through a life no less noble, to a death which was to bring
him into the company of gods he had worshipped and men whom he had
revered.
But although Marcus Aurelius may have
held intellectually that his soul was destined to be absorbed, and to
lose consciousness of itself, there were times when he felt, as all who
hold it must sometimes feel, how unsatisfying is such a creed. Then he
gropes blindly after something less empty and vain. 'Thou hast taken
ship,' he says, 'thou hast sailed, thou art come to land, go out, if to
another life, there also shalt thou find gods, who are everywhere.'
There is more in this than the assumption of a rival theory for
argument's sake. If worldly things 'be but as a dream, the thought is
not far off that there may be an awakening to what is real. When he
speaks of death as a necessary change, and points out that nothing
useful and profitable can be brought about without change, did he
perhaps think of the change in a corn of wheat, which is not quickened
except it die? Nature's marvellous power of recreating out of Corruption
is surely not confined to bodily things. Many of his thoughts sound like
far-off echoes of St. Paul; and it is strange indeed that this most
Christian of emperors has nothing good to say of the Christians. To him
they are only sectaries 'violently and passionately set upon opposition.
Profound as philosophy these Meditations
certainly are not; but Marcus Aurelius was too sincere not to see the
essence of such things as came within his experience. Ancient religions
were for the most part concerned with outward things. Do the necessary
rites, and you propitiate the gods; and these rites were often trivial,
sometimes violated right feeling or even morality. Even when the gods
stood on the side of righteousness, they were concerned with the act
more than with the intent. But Marcus Aurelius knows that what the heart
is full of, the man will do. 'Such as thy thoughts and ordinary
cogitations are,' he says, 'such will thy mind be in time.' And every
page of the book shows us that he knew thought was sure to issue in act.
He drills his soul, as it were, in right principles, that when the time
comes, it may be guided by them. To wait until the emergency is to be
too late.
He sees also the true essence of
happiness. 'If happiness did consist in pleasure, how came notorious
robbers, impure abominable livers, parricides, and tyrants, in so large
a measure to have their part of pleasures?' He who had all the world's
pleasures at command can write thus 'A happy lot and portion is, good
inclinations of the soul, good desires, good actions.'
By the irony of fate this man, so gentle
and good, so desirous of quiet joys and a mind free from care, was set
at the head of the Roman Empire when great dangers threatened from east
and west. For several years he himself commanded his armies in chief. In
camp before the Quadi he dates the first book of his Meditations, and
shows how he could retire within himself amid the coarse clangour of
arms. The pomps and glories which he despised were all his; what to most
men is an ambition or a dream, to him was a round of weary tasks which
nothing but the stern sense of duty could carry him through. And he did
his work well. His wars were slow and tedious, but successful. With a
statesman's wisdom he foresaw the danger to Rome of the barbarian hordes
from the north, and took measures to meet it. As it was, his settlement
gave two centuries of respite to the Roman Empire; had he fulfilled the
plan of pushing the imperial frontiers to the Elbe, which seems to have
been in his mind, much more might have been accomplished. But death cut
short his designs.
Truly a rare opportunity was given to
Marcus Aurelius of showing what the mind can do in despite of
circumstances. Most peaceful of warriors, a magnificent monarch whose
ideal was quiet happiness in home life, bent to obscurity yet born to
greatness, the loving father of children who died young or turned out
hateful, his life was one paradox. That nothing might lack, it was in
camp before the face of the enemy that he passed away and went to his
own place.
***
Translations
THE following is a list of the chief
English translations of Marcus Aurelius: (1) By Meric Casaubon, 1634;
(2) Jeremy Collier, 1701; (3) James Thomson, 1747; (4) R. Graves, 1792;
(5) H. McCormac, 1844; (6) George Long, 1862; (7) G. H. Rendall, 1898;
and (8) J. Jackson, 1906. Renan's "Marc-Aurčle" -- in his "History of
the Origins of Christianity," which appeared in 1882--is the most vital
and original book to be had relating to the time of Marcus Aurelius.
Pater's "Marius the Epicurean" forms another outside commentary, which
is of service in the imaginative attempt to create again the period.
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